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The Comparative Constitutional Law of
Presidential Impeachment
Tom Ginsburg,† Aziz Huq†† & David Landau‡
With the charging and acquittal of President Donald Trump, impeachment
once again assumed a central role in U.S. constitutional law and politics. Yet because so few impeachments, presidential or otherwise, have occurred in U.S history,
we have little understanding of how removing presidents in the middle of a term
alters the direction or quality of a constitutional democracy. This Article illuminates
the appropriate scope and channels of impeachment by providing a comprehensive
description of the law and practice of presidential removal in the global frame. We
first catalog possible modalities of impeachment through case studies from South
Korea, Paraguay, Brazil, and South Africa. We then deploy large-N empirical
analysis of constitutional texts, linked to data about democratic quality in the wake
of successful and unsuccessful removal efforts, in order to understand the impact of
impeachment on democracy. Contrary to claims tendered in the U.S. context, we
show that impeachment is not well conceived as solely and exclusively a tool for removing criminals or similar “bad actors” from the presidency. Instead, it is commonly and effectively used as a tool to resolve a particular kind of political crisis in
which the incumbent has lost most popular support. Moreover, despite much recent
concern about the traumatic and destabilizing effects of an impeachment, we do not
find that either successful or unsuccessful removals have a negative impact on the
quality of democracy as such. Our comparative analysis has normative implications
for the design and practice of impeachment, especially in the United States—
although those implications must be carefully drawn given the limits of feasible
causal inference. The analysis provides consequentialist grounds for embracing a
broader, more political gloss on the famously cryptic phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” in contrast to the narrow, criminal standard that President Trump, in
line with other presidents, promoted. A criminal offense standard, however, might
be appropriate for judges and other officers subject to impeachment. We suggest a
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multitiered impeachment standard is sensible. Also against settled U.S. understandings, the analysis shows how other institutions, such as courts, can and
do play a valuable role in increasing the credibility of factual and legal determinations made during impeachment. Finally, it suggests that impeachment works best
where, in contrast to U.S. design, a successful removal triggers rapid new elections
that can serve as a “hard reboot” for a crisis-ridden political system.
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“Impeach Eisenhower. Impeach Nixon. Impeach Lyndon Johnson.
Impeach Ronald Reagan.”
–ANNIE HALL (Charles H. Joffe, 1977)
INTRODUCTION
The president must go! Thus rings the call across many democracies, including our own. Political opposition and civil society
movements have targeted elected leaders who have become politically unpopular, ineffective, or allegedly (and perhaps actually)
corrupt. Impeachment discussions surged in the United States in
2016 even before President Donald Trump had taken his oath of
office.1 They burst dramatically into the realm of political plausibility in September 2019 with the announcement of an inquiry in
the House of Representatives, which precipitated the third presidential impeachment and Senate trial in U.S. history. Yet this
specter of removal has not been distinctive to Trump. Impeachment talk also dogged his predecessors.2 Nor should Americans
think their discontents unique. In France, the gilets jaunes protest movement has been candid in its “hatred” for President Emmanuel Macron and its desire to see him ousted from office.3 And
in Venezuela, an opposition leader went so far as to declare himself
“interim president” in a (so far, vain) attempt to accelerate the
departure of a well-entrenched presidential incumbent.4 Regime
change has yet to arrive in Caracas, Paris, or Washington, D.C.
But presidents have no cause to rest easy. In democracies as diverse as Brazil, South Korea, and South Africa, presidents have
been removed in the middle of their term in the past decade.5 Impeachment talk is not necessarily idle chatter. At least in some
instances, it is a credible position that can attract sufficient political and popular support to be realized.

1
See, e.g., Emily Jane Fox, Democrats Are Paving the Way to Impeach Donald
Trump, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 15, 2016), https://perma.cc/GG2Q-5VU8.
2
See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, White House Taking Impeachment Seriously, THE HILL
(July 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/FB4Z-64GX; CHARLOTTE DENNETT, THE PEOPLE V. BUSH:
ONE LAWYER’S CAMPAIGN TO BRING THE PRESIDENT TO JUSTICE AND THE NATIONAL
GRASSROOTS MOVEMENT SHE ENCOUNTERS ALONG THE WAY 12 (2010).
3
See Arthur Goldhammer, The Yellow Vests Protests and the Tragedy of Emmanuel
Macron,
FOREIGN
AFFS.
(Dec.
12,
2018),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/france/2018-12-12/yellow-vest-protests-and-tragedy-emmanuel-macron.
4
See Alan Taylor, Photos: A Venezuelan Opposition Leader Declares Himself ‘Interim President’, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/K8GW-PMSE.
5
See infra Part I.
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The removal of a president from office by a mechanism other
than through the regular operation of elections, term limits, and
the normal apparatus of political selection goes to the core of democratic governance. This is a moment of increasing popular
discontent with established regimes, coupled with a growing polarization within the voting publics of many democracies.6 Under
those conditions, it is perhaps unsurprising that elected tenures
would prove to be fragile, and talk of preemptive removal and impeachment endemic.
Nevertheless, legal scholars and social scientists have until
now lagged behind the roiling wave of popular sentiment. To be
sure, there is a wealth of scholarship on the role of impeachment
in the U.S. Constitution.7 That work—much of it excellent—starts
from the Framers’ design, and then reasons from that design to
present applications.8 As a result, it explores a relatively narrow
compass within the space of possible constitutional design. It does
not help that the “Constitution is surprisingly opaque as to how
apex criminality should be addressed.”9 The U.S. Constitution’s
text, for example, uses the ambiguous term “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors”10 to define a threshold for presidential removal. It
is no surprise that Trump, like his predecessors, insisted that this
6
On the relation of polarization to democratic crisis, see Jennifer McCoy, Tahmina
Rahman & Murat Somer, Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities, 62 AM. BEHAV. SCI.
16, 16 (2018) (showing how popular polarization can lead to “gridlock and careening,”
“democratic erosion or collapse under new elites and dominant groups,” or “democratic
erosion or collapse with old elites and dominant groups”).
7
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE (2017);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, TO END A PRESIDENCY: THE POWER OF
IMPEACHMENT (2018); FRANK O. BOWMAN III, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: A
HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT FOR THE AGE OF TRUMP (2019); ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, THE CASE
FOR IMPEACHMENT (2017); ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, THE CASE FOR IMPEACHING TRUMP
(2018). Earlier treatments include CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK
(1974); RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973); Laurence
H. Tribe, Defining High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Basic Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 712 (1999).
8
Correlatively, much of the criticism of that work focuses on the “strategic” nature
of the analysis. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, To End a (Republican) Presidency, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 689, 711–12 (2018) (reviewing TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 7). For a vigorous response to this criticism, see Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, To (Pretend to) Review Our
Book, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 78, 79 (2018) (accusing Professor Paulsen of “repeatedly and
egregiously misdescrib[ing] our thesis, reasoning, and conclusions”). The vehemence of
this debate is indicative of how difficult scholarly discussion of impeachment can be.
9
See Aziz Z. Huq, Legal or Political Checks on Apex Criminality: An Essay on Constitutional Design, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1506, 1508 (2018) [hereinafter Huq, Legal or Political
Checks] (discussing sources of ambiguity).
10 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 4.
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included only statutorily defined crimes.11 The Constitution also
fails to specify a standard of proof for either impeachment or conviction. Again, it is no surprise that both the President’s defenders
and his prosecutors each have asserted their own favored substantive standards of impeachability.12 Finally, the text conspicuously
fails to specify clearly whether a sitting president can be indicted
prior to the completion of impeachment proceedings.13 The result
is a process of deeply uncertain scope and consequences.14 Arguments about many of these uncertainties—not just in the context
of the Trump impeachment, but beyond—necessarily hinge on
predictions about the consequences of presidential ouster.
With many other constitutional questions, our post-ratification
history can provide clarity about consequences. Not so here. To
date, there have been only three successful presidential impeachments; no sitting president has ever been removed.15 We thus
simply have no basis for knowing whether impeachments tend to
shore up democracy, or whether they undermine it.16 The impeachment language in Articles I and II is largely (if not wholly)
general, extending beyond presidents to encompass judges and
certain officials.17 But the history of nonpresidential removals is
also of limited use. Presidential impeachments plainly raise empirical questions, legal problems, and normative concerns beyond
those implicated by the removal of federal judges and other officials. Most obviously, the electoral mandate that presidents, unlike
unelected actors, possess raises a distinctive question about the
democratic legitimacy of impeachment-like removal mechanisms,
such as criminal prosecution or declarations of incapacity, that
bypass the people.18 There is a distinct and pressing question
whether impeachment is consistent with the principle of popular
11 See generally Peter Baker, Trump Team, Opening Defense, Accuses Democrats of
Plot to Subvert Election, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/Z2GH-ZUDZ; Nikolas Bowie, High Crimes Without Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 59 (2018).
12 See Baker, supra note 11.
13 For the Justice Department’s view, see generally A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222 (2000).
14 See, e.g., Nicholas Fandos, Republicans Block Subpoenas for New Evidence as Impeachment Trial Begins, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/KP5B-3K9C.
15 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 88–116 (providing a characteristically incisive account of the Johnson and Clinton impeachments).
16 See Baker, supra note 11.
17 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 77–83 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing the scope of
the impeachment remedy under the U.S. Constitution).
18 See Daniel J. Hemel & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1279–80 (2018).
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sovereignty that underwrites democracy—or whether it is at odds
with democracy as a going concern.
One analytic pathway, however, remains relatively uncharted.
At the same time as the focus of U.S. scholars narrows, there remains a dearth of legal scholarship leveraging other countries’ experience with presidential removal.19 While some political scientists have documented the relatively low success rate of calls for
removal globally,20 no one has systematically examined the design
of presidential impeachment from a comparative perspective.
This is not for want of relevant evidence. As we shall show, the
design of removal procedures for chief executives is almost uniformly a matter of constitutional text, not exclusively statutory
policy. This reflects a (perhaps undertheorized) assumption that
the question is an important one to be insulated, to some extent,
from transient politics. The sheer proliferation of presidential removal provisions also suggests that there is a common problem to
which constitutional designers around the world are responding.
It could well be that designers are responding to slightly different
understandings of a general problem, and are doing so under very
different conditions of democracy (or lack thereof). Wide variance
in context and conceptualization of governance problems might
exist. Yet the observation of a common design choice suggests that
there is something to be learned through comparison. Certainly,
there is no reason to assume that the United States is “exceptional” among presidential regimes in the functions played by impeachment. That is a kind of intellectual parochialism that we
think wise to avoid from the get-go.21
Examination of impeachment provisions and practices globally
is relevant to a number of questions fundamental to a democracy.22 At a minimum, it seems important to know whether the
substantive and procedural elements of the U.S. system are distinctive, or outliers as a matter of constitutional design. Relatedly, a global view of impeachment can illuminate its potential
function in a constitutional democracy, and hence suggest how its
19 But see generally, e.g., John K.M. Ohnesorge, Comparing Impeachment Regimes
(Univ. of Wis. L. Sch. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 1468, 2020).
20 See infra notes 171, 173.
21 See TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
4–5, 245 (2018) (discussing American Exceptionalism).
22 Some of these questions are also likely to matter to authoritarian constitutions,
which are also designed with the aim of minimizing agency costs. See Tom Ginsburg &
Alberto Simpser, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 6 (Tom
Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds., 2013).
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scope and mechanisms might be reconciled with electoral democracy. When should a democratic mandate be superseded because
of the perceived costs of allowing the people’s choice to remain in
power after some form of wrongdoing? If supersession is to be allowed, should it be through a political process (defined and judged
according to partisan standards), or a more formalized, lawgoverned process (say, defined by the criminal law)? And what
mechanisms, institutions, and procedures should be involved in
the removal process? Should they be other elected actors, or nonelected, professional institutions? What should be the result of a
presidential removal: a new election, or either an ally of the president or someone else taking control of the government?
This Article analyzes the problem of presidential impeachment
or removal through a comparative lens. We present here the first
comprehensive analysis of how constitutions globally have
addressed this question, and what the consequences of different
design choices are likely to be. Because actual removals of chief
executives turn out to be rare (although calls to remove are much
more frequent), we employ a twofold empirical strategy. We begin
by developing five case studies, including the United States, of
removals that occur through a range of procedures and under
quite different political conditions. This granular approach helps
pick out some of the variation in constitutional technologies of
presidential removal. It also offers clues as to what legal and political factors matter in practice. Causal inference, to be sure, is
perilous given the small number of observed outcomes and the
endogeneity of observed outcomes to institutional choices. That
is, because presidential behavior will be influenced by the choice
of substantive and procedural impeachment rules, it is not feasible to isolate the effect of those rules on decisions to impeach.
Because the law influences both the independent variable of impeachable acts and the outcome of observed impeachments, no
crisp causal inference is possible. Rather, we tentatively view different structural arrangements as inducing different patterns of
both underlying behavior and removal-related responses. Next,
we zoom out to offer a comprehensive, large-N description and
evaluation of the relevant constitutional design choices. Finally,
we draw carefully nuanced conclusions about the normative
stakes of varying design decisions in this domain.
Before summarizing our key descriptive findings and normative suggestions, we should clarify the universe of cases that we
are considering. Removal of a chief executive is a necessary power
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in any political system, whether presidential, parliamentary, or
otherwise. Even traditional monarchies had procedures for removing kings who were incapacitated or incompetent.23 Our focus,
however, is primarily on fixed-term executives, who tend to be
called presidents.24 Such officials are found in an array of political
systems, including presidential systems, semi-presidential systems,25 and even some parliamentary systems.26 We include heads
of state in parliamentary systems, who tend to have a more ceremonial role, but exclude prime ministers (who are typically disciplined instead through a parliamentary “vote of confidence”
mechanism).27
We show first that impeachment does not always focus on the
criminal behavior or bad acts of an individual president. Rather,
it also serves as a response to a particular kind of political crisis
in a presidential system, commonly in which public support for
the leader has collapsed. In some recent impeachments, such as
in South Korea, crisis combined with evidence of criminality to
oust a president from office.28 But in other cases, such as in Brazil
23 Indeed, during the Middle Ages the question of monarchical removal became a
central problem for English constitutional theory; between 1327 and 1485, five English
monarchs were deposed. See William Huse Dunham, Jr. & Charles T. Wood, The Right to
Rule in England: Depositions and the Kingdom’s Authority, 1327–1485, 81 AM. HIST. REV.
738, 760–61 (1976). Two centuries later, regicide was hedged with numerous defenses. See
Amos Tubb, Printing the Regicide of Charles I, 89 HIST. 500, 509–10 (2004).
24 The main exception is the South African example that we look at briefly in Part I
below. The South African president is the executive in South Africa’s parliamentary system—he or she is selected by the Parliament and can be removed by the Parliament at
any time via a vote of no confidence, as well as through an impeachment-like mechanism.
We nonetheless include the recent example of President Jacob Zuma’s resignation because
it sheds light on the ways in which nonlegislative institutions might facilitate presidential
removal.
25 See Robert Elgie, A Fresh Look at Semipresidentialism: Variations on a Theme, 16
J. DEMOCRACY 98, 99–101 (2005).
26 For example, the Czech and Slovak states have nonelected presidents coexisting
with elected parliaments. See Matthew S. Shugart, Of Presidents and Parliaments, 2 E.
EUR. CONST. REV. 30, 31 (1993). On the increasing similarity between presidential and
parliamentary systems, see Oren Tamir, Governing by Chief Executives 3–6 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors); José Antonio Cheibub, Zachary Elkins & Tom Ginsburg, Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 515, 537 (2014);
Richard Albert, The Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, 57 AM. J. COMPAR.
L. 531, 549–55 (2009); Paul Webb & Thomas Poguntke, The Presidentialization of Contemporary Democratic Politics: Evidence, Causes and Consequences, in THE
PRESIDENTIALIZATION OF POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MODERN DEMOCRACIES 336,
340–41 (Paul Webb & Thomas Poguntke eds., 2005).
27 See John D. Huber, The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies, 90 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 269, 270–72 (1996) (describing vote of confidence mechanisms in eighteen
democracies).
28 See infra Part I.A.
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and Paraguay, there was scant evidence of apex criminality.29 Removal was rather used to push out weak presidents who had lost
the ability to govern. Consistent with this practice, many constitutions around the world include a textual standard for removal
that explicitly goes beyond criminality to include governance
failures or poor performance in office, while others enable such
an approach through ambiguity. Generalizing from textual evidence and case studies, we suggest that impeachment globally is,
in practice, a device to mitigate the risk of paralyzing political
gridlock, rather than simply a way to deal with individual malfeasance. A second important empirical conclusion follows. Examining measures of democratic quality in impeachment’s wake,
we find no evidence (at least in the small sample of extant cases)
that impeachment of a president reduces the quality of democracy
in countries where it is carried out.30 The same holds true when
removal through impeachment is attempted, but not completed.
The fear that a more political impeachment process would necessarily be destabilizing has no empirical support in the recent comparative experience. Rather than being a way of undermining or
circumventing democracy, we suggest that in fact impeachment
may play an important role in its stabilization.
Although we tread carefully in drawing normative conclusions given the limited pool of available data and endogeneity concerns, our analysis nevertheless has implications for the design
and practice of impeachment, particularly in the United States.
We argue that a model of impeachment focused only on the individual culpability of chief executives—what we call a “bad actor”
model—is likely incomplete and undesirable as a functional
matter. Instead, impeachment processes should be attentive to
the broader political context, which we call a “political reset”
model. Impeachment can be useful to ameliorate one of the major weaknesses of presidentialism—rigidity31—by removing
poorly performing presidents when their support has collapsed.
Professor Stephen Griffin has recently tracked the history of
impeachment discourse in the United States to show that partisan dynamics forced it into a Procrustean bed of “indictable

29

See infra Parts I.B and I.C.
See infra Table 2.
31 A point, of course, made in the classic essay by Professor Juan Linz. See Juan J.
Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J. DEMOCRACY 51, 56–57 (1990).
30
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crimes” and nothing more.32 Consistent with Griffin’s careful
analysis, Trump’s legal team argued in the Senate that the
House’s articles were deficient in part because impeachment was
only appropriate in the event of a violation of “established law”
and, likely, “criminal law.”33 We think, to the contrary, that the
comparative evidence suggests that such a narrow interpretation
of the term “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” may well be problematic. A broader, more political meaning of this notoriously
cryptic standard may make more functional sense as an element
of a well-functioning democracy.
Aside from shedding new light on the well-studied issue of
“high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” our analysis also critiques a
range of crucial but less studied features of impeachment in the
United States. Some are a product of judicial or political practice;
others would require a constitutional amendment to fix. All are
taken as givens—in quite problematic ways. For example, we
highlight the striking fact that the impeachment standard in the
United States is uniform across different types of actors, such as
presidents, judges, and cabinet members, rather than varying as
in many other countries. We think a more differentiated approach
makes more sense. Impeachment of different kinds of actors
serves different purposes, and it makes little sense to use a onesize-fits-all approach. We also highlight the ways in which actors
other than legislatures contribute fact-finding, legitimacy, and
other benefits to impeachment processes in some contexts. In particular, and contrary to the settled understanding in the United
States and the leading precedent,34 we suggest that a more robust
role for courts in impeachment processes may be consistent with
a political, regime-centered model of impeachment. In some contexts, courts can lend credibility to factual and legal determinations made during impeachment—a credibility that has been in
short supply during recent processes in the United States. Finally, our analysis suggests that impeachment design in the

32 See Stephen M. Griffin, Presidential Impeachment in Tribal Times: The Historical
Logic of Informal Constitutional Change, 51 CONN. L. REV. 413, 423–25 (2019).
33 See Trial Memorandum of President Donald J. Trump at 1, In re Impeachment of
President Donald J. Trump (U.S. Senate 2020) (quotations marks omitted),
https://perma.cc/42Z4-WNDD (arguing that for this reason, “abuse of power” was not an
impeachable offense); cf. Bowie, supra note 11 (canvassing arguments that crimes are not
required).
34 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29, 233–34 (1993) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to impeachment procedures of a federal judge as a “political question”
beyond judicial competence).
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United States fails to maximize its value by having the vice president (or a similar actor) automatically succeed to office, rather
than calling new elections. We think that calling new elections
after a successful impeachment is a superior option because it
increases impeachment’s ability to serve as a reset for a crisisladen system.
We recognize that this topic is of great current interest in the
United States, largely because of the recent impeachment trial
and acquittal of Trump. Indeed, there is a growing academic and
nonacademic literature on the topic of his impeachment.35 Some
of these contributions confront Trump’s actions in light of the relevant standard; others are more abstract treatments not limited
to the particulars of his case. We place ourselves in the latter
camp, abstracting away from the current presidency, and avoiding
inevitably partisan implications in the hope of generating more
durable insights. At the same time, we also recognize that the occasion of the Trump impeachment and acquittal seems to be a
particularly good moment to stimulate careful reflection on an important constitutional issue.
Our analysis is organized as follows. Part I motivates our
analysis by presenting case studies of recent instances of presidential removals from around the world: South Korea, Brazil,
Paraguay, and South Africa. We also briefly survey U.S. law and
experience to benchmark domestic experience. Part II draws on
large-N empirical evidence to describe and analyze the history,
rules, and practice of presidential removal globally. We find that
impeachment is often a response to governance problems related
to waning public support for a fixed-term leader. It thus extends
beyond the standard bad actor model that dominates much of the
American legal discourse. Systems vary in terms of both the predicate acts that can trigger impeachment along with the process,
including both the actors involved and the various rules governing
time and consequence. Finally, Part III draws on this evidence to
theorize better impeachment institutions, focusing on implications for the United States. We conclude by suggesting that at
least as a prima facie matter a more frequent, systemic use of impeachment in presidential democracies, including our own,
should not be feared. It is likely to do more good than harm.
35 See generally, e.g., LICHTMAN, THE CASE FOR IMPEACHMENT, supra note 7; cf. generally ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE AGAINST IMPEACHING TRUMP (2018). At the very
least, this tide of books provides evidence of the impoverished imagination of book publishers when it comes to titles.
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I. THE IRRESISTIBLE RISE OF IMPEACHMENT: SNAPSHOTS FROM
THE WORLD OF PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL
We begin by considering the three most recent cases of successful removal by impeachment—in South Korea, Brazil, and
Paraguay—along with the removal of President Jacob Zuma midway through his second term in South Africa as a consequence of
a protracted corruption-related investigation. These case studies
are useful for “clarifying previously obscure theoretical relationships” and as a step toward “richer models” than would be
enabled by purely large-N analysis.36 The case study approach is
especially appropriate here because, as we demonstrate in
Part II, the rate of successful impeachments in the past half century or so turns out to be small in comparison to the denominator
of elected chief executives holding office, or even the number of
proposals for impeachment.37 Impeachment is often proposed and
rarely realized. A case study approach allows a thick account of
most of the relevant positive instances of impeachment or removal that would be missed by a large-N analysis alone. Finally,
by way of counterpoint (and to tee up our normative analysis in
Part III), we recapitulate briefly the historical framing and practice of impeachment in the United States as a point of reference
and contrast.
In each of our first three case studies, directly elected presidents did not finish their terms, albeit for different reasons. South
Korea’s President Park Geun-hye was removed from office in
2017 after an impeachment confirmed by the Constitutional
Court. Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff was removed in 2016
shortly after her reelection to a second term in relation to an alleged fraud scheme. And Paraguay’s President Fernando Lugo
was removed from office in 2012, primarily on the grounds that
he had botched policy decisions prior to and after a massacre
involving a land invasion. In each of these cases, the ousted presidents were extremely unpopular. Their ousters constituted a political opening, consequently, for political opponents, who gained
new access to the levers of power. In South Africa, in contrast,

36 Timothy J. McKeown, Case Studies and the Limits of the Quantitative Worldview,
in RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS 139, 153 (Henry E.
Brady & David Collier eds., 2004).
37 See infra Table 1 (finding 10 removals in 213 attempts since 1990); see also infra
Part II.A.
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where presidents are selected by the Parliament rather than directly elected, Zuma was replaced by a leader of his own party,
after losing support from within the party.
In our view, all of these removals had normative justifications, albeit ones not necessarily anchored in the specific criminal
acts of a given leader. But the political outcomes they produced
were radically different. For example, after removing the incumbent, South Koreans elected a left-wing candidate, President
Moon Jae-in, while Brazilians chose a fiery right-wing populist,
President Jair Bolsonaro. His tenure is still too new to evaluate,
but concerns about democratic backsliding and state violence
have deepened. In contrast, Zuma was replaced by his copartisan
President Cyril Ramaphosa, who went on to lead the African National Congress (ANC) party to a close election win. In most of
these cases, the system has found a new equilibrium, and democracy has not fallen.
A. South Korea: The Park Impeachment
The South Korean Constitution allows impeachment for a “violat[ion of] the Constitution or other laws in the performance of
official duties.”38 A majority of members of the National Assembly
can propose an impeachment bill for the president, which must
then be approved by a two-thirds vote.39 The president is immediately suspended from serving; his or her duties pass on to the
Prime Minister.40 In a second stage, the impeachment motion
then goes to the Constitutional Court for final approval.41
In the first Korean impeachment of the twenty-first century,
this last step proved dispositive. In 2004, President Roh Moohyun was impeached.42 Before the Constitutional Court could decide on the question of removal, an intervening parliamentary
election gave Roh’s party a slim parliamentary majority.43 The
court, perhaps in a move of political pragmatism, decided that the
charges against Roh were not sufficient to warrant removal.44 Roh

38

S. KOR. CONST. art. 65.
S. KOR. CONST. art. 65.
40 S. KOR. CONST. arts. 65, 71.
41 S. KOR. CONST. art. 111.
42 Youngjae Lee, Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Impeachment of Roh Moo-hyun
from a Comparative Constitutional Perspective, 53 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 403, 411–12 (2005).
43 See id. at 412.
44 See id. at 418–19.
39
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went on to serve to the end of his term, though he eventually committed suicide during a corruption probe.45 The Constitutional
Court’s decision was systemically important for clarifying many
of the relevant rules.46 Most importantly, it held that even if
charges against a president were well-founded, removal should
only occur if there was a grave violation of law and if removal was
“necessary to rehabilitate the damaged constitutional order.”47
The court also explained the division of labor in impeachment
cases, holding that the Assembly had a political and fact-finding
role, while the bench itself was the ultimate judge of whether the
facts presented met the legal threshold for removal.48
A decade later, a second South Korean president faced defenestration. This time the court ratified some of the grounds for impeachment. President Park Geun-hye, like most Korean presidents, found her popularity dropping precipitously after her 2012
election.49 In 2016, it was revealed that she had been taking instruction from, and acting on behalf of, a close confidant, Choi Soonsil.50 Choi’s father had been the head of a secretive cult and an
associate of Park’s father, President Park Chung-hee. Choi had
been extorting money from Korea’s large business corporations.
When these facts were revealed, massive public demonstrations
ensued and the opposition party filed impeachment motions
against Park.51 The charges included seven counts, including, inter
alia, abuse of power, violating the duty of confidentiality by sharing government documents with Choi, and violation of the right
to life in the Sewol ferry disaster, which had taken the lives of
hundreds of high school students in 2014. Several members of
Park’s own Saenuri Party joined in passing the motion by the required two-thirds vote, and Park was suspended as president.52

45 See Martin Fackler, Recriminations and Regrets Follow Suicide of South Korean,
N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2009), https://perma.cc/CQH7-UDTY.
46 See Lee, supra note 42, at 415–20.
47 See id. at 419 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (translating the Constitutional Court’s opinion).
48 See Hunbeobjaepanso [Const. Ct.], May 14, 2004, 2004Hun-Na1 (Hungong at 157)
(S. Kor.); Chun-Yuan Lin, Court in Political Conflict: Note on South Korean Impeachment
Case, 4 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 249, 260 (2009).
49 See Yul Sohn & Won-Taek Kang, South Korea in 2012: An Election Year Under
Rebalancing Challenges, 53 ASIAN SURV. 198, 201 (2013).
50 See South Korea’s President Fights Impeachment and Other Demons, THE
ECONOMIST (Dec. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/4JEW-TX4E.
51 See Gi-Wook Shin & Rennie J. Moon, South Korea After Impeachment, 28 J.
DEMOCRACY 117, 119 (2017).
52 See id. at 119–22.
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As in Roh’s case, the Constitutional Court then initiated its
proceedings.
On March 10, 2017, the court delivered a verdict upholding
Park’s impeachment on three of the seven counts: violation of the
obligation to serve the public interest, infringement upon private
property rights, and violation of confidentiality.53 Her interactions
with the “shaman or medium” Choi were central to this finding,
as they were to the growing tide of public anger at her administration’s corruption.54 The court did not accept three other
grounds for impeachment, including one based on allegations related to the Sewol ferry disaster, and it found a final charge—the
“obligation to faithfully execute the duties of the President”—to
be nonjusticiable.55 The court then held that these charges met
the test for seriousness laid out during the Roh impeachment case
because they gave a private citizen influence over the office of the
presidency.56 Park was subsequently convicted in criminal court.
She is currently serving a twenty-five-year prison term.57
Under the South Korean Constitution, an impeached president
is replaced by the prime minister, a weak vice presidential figure
without independent executive authority. Moreover, the prime
minister assumes presidential duties as soon as the impeachment
charge is approved by the National Assembly, while the Constitutional Court conducts its trial. Importantly, though, the Acting
Presidency lasts only until a new presidential election can be
held, a period of no more than sixty days.58 After Park’s removal,
Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn remained in office until new elections in May 2017 brought in Moon Jae-in.59
In our view, the removal of Park before her five-year term
ended was a model of procedural integrity. The impeachment decision by the Constitutional Court laid out in depth the extent to
which Park had given over the public trust to a private individual,
with no official position or relevant experience. It resolved a major
political crisis in which hundreds of thousands of people were
demonstrating in Seoul. The court’s judgment, moreover, provides
53 See Hunbeobjaepanso [Const. Ct.], Mar. 10, 2017, 2016Hun-Na1 (Hungong 1, 46–
52) (S. Kor.).
54 See Shin & Moon, supra note 51, at 119.
55 See 2016Hun-Na1 at 59–60.
56 See id. at 48.
57 See Choe Sang-Hun, Park Geun-hye, Ex-South Korean Leader, Gets 25 Years in
Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/42A8-GRCC.
58 See S. KOR. CONST. art. 68.
59 See Shin & Moon, supra note 51, at 122, 124.
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a model of sober evaluation of the evidence, rejecting superfluous
charges while upholding those for which the evidence was clear.
At the same time, the court’s careful election of some impeachment
grounds over others seems to have tracked the nature of public
discontent at the perceived dysfunctionality of the Park
government.
B. Brazil: The Rousseff Ouster
Shortly after President Dilma Rousseff had been elected to
her second term in office as Brazil’s president, a scandal known
as “Operation Car Wash” revealed massive corruption tied to
Brazil’s state-owned oil company during the period she had been
in charge of it before becoming president.60 Though no evidence
emerged that she was personally involved, Rousseff was held politically responsible for the failings of her party’s (the Worker’s
Party, or “PT”) long period in governance. With public discontent
at PT’s perceived corruption rising, opponents began to look for a
hook to remove her. In late 2015, Rousseff was charged with a
violation of article 85 of the constitution, which details the
grounds for impeachment.61 Just like previous presidencies,
Rousseff’s administration had engaged in an accounting maneuver to try to make it look as if the government had more assets
than it did. The maneuver allowed it to allocate funds to social
programs without direct allocation from the Congress. A tax court
held the maneuver to be illegal, opening the door to an impeachment
that many analysts believed to be primarily partisan.62
The substantive grounds for impeachment in the Brazilian
Constitution are ambiguous. Article 85 states:
Acts of the President of the Republic that are attempts
against the Federal Constitution are impeachable offenses,
especially those against the: I. existence of the Union; II. free
exercise of the powers of the Legislature, Judiciary, Public
Ministry and constitutional powers of the units of the Federation; III. exercise of political, individual and social rights;

60 See Marcus André Melo, Latin America’s New Turbulence: Crisis and Integrity in
Brazil, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 50, 60 (2016).
61 See BRAZ. CONST. art. 85.
62 For a particularly pugnacious account in these terms, see Teun A. van Dijk, How
Globo Media Manipulated the Impeachment of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, 11
DISCOURSE & COMMC’N 199, 202 (2017).
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IV. internal security of the Country; V. probity in administration; VI. the budget law; [and] VII. compliance with the
laws and court decisions.63
Article 85 of the Brazilian Constitution thus lays out a fairly
broad and reasonably political—as opposed to strictly legal—
standard for impeachment, which seems to reach well beyond
criminality. It also includes a “by law” clause giving legislation
the power to further define both the standards and process for
impeachment. The relevant law, Law 1079, was passed in 1950,
and so predates the current constitution of 1988, although the law
was amended more recently.64 The law, oddly, conflicts with the
constitutional text in certain key respects. Some commentators
have suggested the law may play a bigger influence on impeachment
in practice than the constitution itself.65 The law fleshes out the
broader categories found in article 85, but still maintains a definition of those terms that is highly political in nature.
The allegations against Rousseff focused on crimes against
the administration and the budget, chiefly (as noted above) that
she disbursed public money without congressional authorization.66 The allegations also linked Rousseff to the Operation Car
Wash scandal, albeit indirectly. More specifically, it was argued
that she had failed to act with sufficient vigor against participants
in the scandal.67 This latter allegation, however, did not become
the basis for impeachment, which instead focused (at least formally)
solely on the alleged illegal appropriations.68
Article 86 of the constitution fleshes out the bare bones of the
process of impeachment of the president, which again is regulated
more closely in Law 1079 and in internal congressional bylaws.69
Under that process, the lower House investigates accusations and
decides whether to impeach the president, by a two-thirds vote.

63

BRAZ. CONST. 1988, art. 85.
See Lei No. 1.079, de 10 de Abril de 1950, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de
12.04.1950 (Braz.).
65 For example, the law is broader than the constitution in terms of which officials
are subject to impeachment, and it imposes a different term—five years rather than
eight—of potential disqualification from public office in the event of a successful impeachment and removal. See Lei No. 1.079 art. 68.
66 See Melo, supra note 60, at 50–51.
67 See id. at 60.
68 Cultural expectations about women’s appropriate role in public life may also have
played a role. See Omar G. Encarnación, The Patriarchy’s Revenge: How Retro-Macho Politics Doomed Dilma Rousseff, 34 WORLD POL’Y J. 82, 83 (2017).
69 See BRAZ. CONST. 1988, art. 86.
64
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Cases then proceed either to the Senate (in cases of “impeachable
offenses” defined in article 85) or to the Supreme Court (in cases
of “common criminal offenses”), for the final trial.70 Once the Senate begins removal proceedings, the president is suspended for up
to 180 days during the trial. A two-thirds vote of the Senate is
required to remove officials from office for commission of an “impeachable offense.” As in the United States, the president of the
Supreme Court must be present and must preside over the trial
that occurs in the Senate.71
In 2016, Rousseff was formally impeached by the required
two-thirds vote in the lower house on a vote of 367–13, and trial
commenced in the Senate.72 When the Senate voted to initiate removal proceedings, Rousseff was suspended and Vice President
Michel Temer took over as acting president. Temer retained this
position after the Senate voted on August 31 to remove Rousseff
from office, again by a two-thirds vote of 61–20, from August 2016
until the end of 2018.73 But at the same time, the Senate failed to
reach a two-thirds supermajority to deprive Rousseff of her political rights for eight years. As a result, she retained the ability to
run for future office (and indeed ran unsuccessfully for a Senate
seat in 2018).74
The Supreme Court played a complex, multilayered role
throughout the episode as an agenda setter and adjudicator of key
procedural choices. Unlike its South Korean analogue, however,
it exercised no ex post review once the legislative part of the impeachment process had come to its conclusion. Actors on all sides
of the political spectrum bombarded the bench with a series of
challenges and requests throughout the impeachment process.
The court’s response was mixed. On the one hand, the court generally avoided judging the substantive question whether the

70

See BRAZ. CONST. 1988, art. 86.
See BRAZ. CONST. 1988, art. 86.
72 Andrew Jacobs, Brazil’s Lower House of Congress Votes for Impeachment of Dilma
Rousseff, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/57KR-JK4C.
73 Simon Romero, Dilma Rousseff Is Ousted as Brazil’s President in Impeachment
Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), https://perma.cc/74JJ-64WK.
74 It is unclear under the constitution whether the Senate has the power to split
the impeachment vote into two issues, one of removal and one of loss of political rights,
since the text of the constitution seems to state that loss of political rights for eight
years is an automatic consequence of impeachment and removal, although the text of
Law 1079 contemplates two distinct votes. See Alexandra Rattinger, The Impeachment
Process of Brazil: A Comparative Look at Impeachment in Brazil and the United States,
49 U. MIA. INTER-AM. L. REV. 129, 155 (2018).
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allegations against Rousseff were sufficient for impeachment, demurring to the legislature.75 On the other hand, it issued some
judgments that impacted the process in meaningful ways. For example, the court issued a ruling in December 2015, when the impeachment process was just beginning, that allowed the process
to go forward but held that the committee investigating Rousseff
needed to be reconstituted because it had previously been stacked
with proponents of impeachment, in violation of the relevant laws
and regulations.76 Membership in the committee, directed the
court, needed to be proportional to the composition of the House.77
The court also held that the Senate, as well as the House, should
issue a preliminary vote on whether to accept the impeachment
allegation against Rousseff.78
It is worth noting that, as in South Korea, the recent Brazilian
impeachment had a historical precursor: President Fernando Collor de Mello’s ouster in 1992, shortly after Brazil’s transition to
democracy.79 The latter shared key features with Rousseff’s removal. As with Rousseff, political context rendered Collor vulnerable to impeachment. He was an outsider president without
strong ties to existing parties; he hence had great difficulty
building a governing legislative coalition. Collor was forced to
resort aggressively to unilateral decree powers because of his lack
of partisan support, often reissuing provisional decrees before
they could expire.80 Opponents alleged that this practice was abusive. It was eventually restricted by the Supreme Court and then
by a constitutional amendment.81

75 See Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, Abusive Impeachment? Brazilian Political Turmoil
and the Judicialization of Mega-Politics, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Apr. 23, 2016),
https://perma.cc/2R66-ACHH.
76 See Steven Wildberger, Brazil Supreme Court Sets Stage for President’s Impeachment, JURIST (Dec. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/3LXL-Q5GM; Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, Institutions Matter: The Brazilian Supreme Court’s Decision on Impeachment,
INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Dec. 31, 2015), https://perma.cc/KFB9-RWQZ.
77 See Benvindo, supra note 76.
78 See id.
79 See Theotonio Dos Santos, Brazil’s Controlled Purge: The Impeachment of Fernando Collor, 27 NACLA REP. ON AMS. 17, 20–21 (1993).
80 See Carlos Pereira, Timothy J. Power & Lucio Rennó, Under What Conditions Do
Presidents Resort to Decree Power? Theory and Evidence from the Brazilian Case, 67 J.
POL. 178, 185 (2005).
81 See Thomas Skidmore, Collor’s Downfall in Historical Perspective, in CORRUPTION
AND POLITICAL REFORM IN BRAZIL: THE IMPACT OF COLLOR’S IMPEACHMENT 1, 5–6 (Keith
S. Rosenn & Richard Downes eds., 1999).
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The immediate triggers for Collor’s impeachment were corruption allegations. The House’s charges did not allege any specific crimes, but rather facilitating “the breach of law and order”
and behaving in a way that was inconsistent with the “dignity” of
the presidential office.82 Collor argued that noncriminal acts could
not be the basis for impeachment. But the House and Senate proceeded to impeach him regardless. Collor technically resigned before
the impeachment was completed, but the Congress nonetheless finished the process, with the Senate voting in favor by an overwhelming 76–3 vote. As in the Rousseff impeachment, judges played a
major role in Collor’s: the president of the Supreme Court, in his
role presiding over the Senate trial, crafted special rules that simplified and streamlined some of the procedures found in
Law 1079.83
What lessons does the Rousseff impeachment (and its echoes
in the Collor impeachment) hold for the comparative study of
presidential removal? To begin with, unlike the Park ouster in
South Korea, it is hard to conceptualize Rousseff’s impeachment
as being about criminal behavior, or even serious moral wrongs,
of the President herself. The acts that formed the basis of her impeachment—basically, accounting tricks and related devices to
authorize additional social spending, allegedly with the intent of
helping the PT retain power—had been engaged in by presidents
prior to Rousseff. Even the broader context for the allegations and
impeachment, which revolved around alleged involvement with
the Operation Car Wash investigation, did not yield much evidence inculpating Rousseff herself. Rather, she was accused of
negligence in handling accusations and being connected to involved
actors. But these accusations did not meaningfully distinguish
her from the larger political class. So it is perhaps unsurprising
that Rousseff’s impeachment prompted outcry in some quarters
and was described by her and her allies as a coup.84
The political framing of the impeachment resonates even
more when Brazil’s recent political history is brought into the
analysis. Rousseff’s 2014 reelection campaign had been fought in

82 See Rattinger, supra note 74, at 148 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thomas
Skidmore, The Impeachment Process and the Constitutional Significance of the Collor Affair,
in CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL REFORM IN BRAZIL, supra note 81, at 10).
83 See id. at 149.
84 See Benvindo, supra note 75. See generally Keith E. Whittington, Is Presidential
Impeachment Like a Coup?, 18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2020).
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a context where the revelations of the Operation Car Wash investigation started to discredit the country’s political class as a
whole. When she won reelection in 2014, it was by a much smaller
margin than in 2010.85 Indeed, her PT party lost support in Congress. In consequence, she was forced to rely on a more fluid pattern of support without a clear majority coalition to legislate. The
president of the House, Congressman Eduardo Cunha, was never
an ally of the PT and became strongly opposed to it in mid-July
2015; his party (the second largest in the House) turned against
Rousseff during the impeachment process, depriving her of
needed support. The theory of the case against Rousseff also “echoed the street protests” against the PT more generally.86 At the
time, the economy in Brazil was experiencing an extended period
of stagnation.87
But, crucially, the impeachment did not reset the political
system. New presidential elections did not occur until 2018. Instead,
Temer took over the chief executive’s role. As a result, PT allies
saw the impeachment, as well as related actions like the jailing of
former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, as an attempt by more
traditional and conservative actors to take down the country’s
most organized progressive force.88 Temer served for about two
and a half years after Rousseff’s suspension, but was a weak and
unpopular president. He had already been implicated in corruption more directly than Rousseff, as were many of those who remained in Congress.89 The discrediting of Brazil’s political class
en masse continued; space thus opened for self-styled outsider
and right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro to win election in 2018.
Bolsonaro has not been immune from impeachment talk, either. Notorious for consistently dismissing the COVID-19 virus

85 See Vincent Bevins, Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff Narrowly Reelected, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-ff-dilma
-rousseff-election-brazil-20141026-story.html.
86 See Emilio Peluso Neder Meyer, Judges and Courts Destabilizing Constitutionalism: The Brazilian Judiciary Branch’s Political and Authoritarian Character, 19 GERMAN
L.J. 727, 732 (2018).
87 See Melo, supra note 60, at 52.
88 See, e.g., van Dijk, supra note 62, at 203 (describing Temer as “the figurehead of
what was generally seen as a political coup”).
89 See Brian Winter, Brazil’s Never-Ending Corruption Crisis: Why Radical Transparency Is the Only Fix, 96 FOREIGN AFFS. 87, 90–91 (2017).
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as the “little flu,”90 Bolsonaro’s erratic performance and authoritarian rhetoric have led to calls for his impeachment from Lula,
among others.91 At the time of writing, some forty-eight petitions
for impeachment are before the Speaker of the House, though it
is not clear whether he will let them advance.92 This is in part
because Vice President Hamilton Mourão, whose popularity exceeds that of Bolsonaro, is considered a wild card himself with
possible authoritarian leanings. The lack of a reset option has
worked to Bolsonaro’s advantage.
C. Paraguay: The Removal of Lugo
The removal of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo by
Congress in 2012 is another case which is difficult to interpret as
the removal of a criminal or morally depraved leader. A former
Catholic bishop and political outsider, Lugo won the presidency
in 2008 on the ticket of a small party and in alliance with seven
other political parties, ending over sixty years of rule by the Colorado Party.93 In return for the support of the largest opposition
party, the Liberal Party, he picked an insider vice president, Federico Franco, with Liberal bona fides.94 Lugo and his vice president
were not close. There were rumors from early in Lugo’s term that
the Liberals were seeking to supplant him with Franco.95 Further,
Lugo was unsuccessful at carrying out most of his initially ambitious political and economic programs, especially on his signature
issue of land reform, and over time his popularity fell sharply.96

90 Simone Preissler Iglesias, Martha Viotti Beck & Samy Adghirni, ‘Little Flu’ Can’t
Hurt Him: Why Bolsonaro Still Shuns Lockdowns, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://perma.cc/V6Z4-DNSS.
91 Vasco Cotovio & Isa Soares, Brazil’s Former President Calls for Bolsonaro to Be
Impeached, CNN (June 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/7R5R-L7N4.
92 Lisandra Paraguassu & Gabriela Mello, Brazil’s House Speaker Says Not the Right
Time to Handle Impeachment Requests Against Bolsonaro, REUTERS (July 24, 2020),
https://perma.cc/WYX5-2WVC.
93 Bryan Pitts, Rosemary Joyce, Russell Sheptak, Kregg Hetherington, Marco Castillo & Rafael Ioris, 21st Century Golpismo: A NACLA Roundtable, 48 NACLA REP. ON
AMS. 334, 337 (2016).
94 See id. at 337–38.
95 Id. at 339. Serious impeachment discussions were also not new in Paraguayan political culture: President Raúl Cubas Grau resigned in 1999 after impeachment proceedings
had been initiated, and Senator Luis González Macchi narrowly survived a Senate removal
vote in 2003. See ANÍBAL S. PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT AND THE NEW
POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA 29–35 (2007).
96 See Leiv Marsteintredet, Mariana Llanos & Detlef Nolte, Paraguay and the Politics of Impeachment, 24 J. DEMOCRACY 110, 112–13 (2013).
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He was unable to pass any significant legislation in a deeply divided Congress. His own coalition remained highly factionalized.97
There was considerable instability during Lugo’s term, with other
impeachment attempts prior to the successful one. A failed military coup led to Lugo’s replacement of the entire military leadership
in 2009.98
The proximate cause for the Lugo impeachment was an incident
on June 15, 2012, where seventeen people (six police officers and
eleven farmers) were killed.99 Landless farmers occupied land estates that they alleged had been unlawfully acquired, leading to
the clashes. The impeachment charges laid against Lugo focused
on this incident, as well as four others,100 and complained in general terms of “bad performance in office.”101 Referring to the killings, the charging document also stated sweepingly that Lugo
had exercised power in an “inappropriate, negligent and irresponsible way . . . generating constant confrontation and war between
social classes.”102 It did not accuse Lugo, though, of committing a
crime. Like the Brazilian organic law, the Paraguayan Constitution explicitly allowed impeachment for poor political
performance.103
A lightning-fast process of impeachment began and ended
within the space of mere days. On June 21, 2012, the Chamber of
Deputies voted to impeach Lugo by a 76–1 vote; the next day, the
Senate voted to remove him from office by a 39–4 vote.104 The rules
required a two-thirds vote of those present in the Chamber of

97 See Daniel Jatobá & Bruno Theodoro Luciano, The Deposition of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo and Its Repercussions in South American Regional Organizations,
12 BRAZ. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 7 (2018).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 8.
100 These other four incidents included: (1) authorizing a demonstration in front of the
Armed Forces Engineering Command, with slogans against the “oligarchic sectors,” (2) supporting several land invasions of large estates, (3) growing insecurity and an unwillingness
to confront a guerrilla movement, and (4) signing the Ushuaia II Protocol of Mercosur in a
way that violated national sovereignty. Id.
101 See Magdalena López, Democracia en Paraguay: La Interrupción del “Proceso de
Cambio” con la Destitución de Fernando Lugo Méndez (2012), 31 CUADERNOS DEL CENDES
95, 112 (2014) (quoting Libelo Acusatorio, Resolución H. Cámara de Diputados
No. 1431/2012 (2012)), https://perma.cc/U6UP-2QMX (our translation).
102 Id. at 112–13 (our translation).
103 The Constitution of Paraguay allows impeachment of the president and certain
other high officials for “for bad performance in office, for crimes committed in exercise of
their office or for common crimes.” See PARA. CONST. 1992, art. 225.
104 Paraguay’s Impeachment: Lugo Out in the Cold, THE ECONOMIST (June 30, 2012),
https://perma.cc/LVP6-6C33.
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Deputies for impeachment and a two-thirds absolute majority of
members of the Senate for removal. Both thresholds were easily
met.105 Under the constitutional framework in force, the vice president and Liberal Party member Franco, who had become a manifest opponent of Lugo, then became president.106
Lugo and his allies complained of a lack of due process in his
impeachment. They pointed to the breathtaking speed of the impeachment and the fact that he was offered only two hours to appear before the Senate to present his defense. Like Rousseff and
her allies, regional leaders condemned the removal as an “institutional coup.”107 The leaders of many other countries in the region agreed.108 Paraguay was in fact suspended from regional organizations Mercosur and Unasur until the next set of elections
were held in the country in 2013.109 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued a statement calling the speed with
which the removal was carried out “unacceptable” and stating
that it was “highly questionable” that the removal of a Head of
State could be “done within 24 hours while still respecting the due
process guarantees necessary for an impartial trial.”110 It concluded that the speed of the procedure raised “profound questions
as to its integrity.”111
It is hard to see the Paraguayan example, with its extraordinary speed and resulting lack of deliberation, as a model of how
impeachment should be done. At the same time, the case shows
how impeachment can work more as an attempted exit from a political crisis rather than a judgment of criminal behavior (or serious wrongdoing) by the incumbent. Like the Rousseff removal,
but even more clearly, the impeachment of Lugo did not focus on
his culpable status as a “bad actor.” The opponents of Lugo did
not argue that he had committed a statutory crime. Instead, they
relied on his “poor performance of duties” (mal desempeño de sus
funciones) in office, a noncriminal ground of impeachment expressly contemplated in the Paraguayan Constitution.112
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As in the Park and the Rousseff cases, it appears that a decisive factor in Lugo’s impeachment was the fragility of his political
support. Lugo was removed because he had lost the support of
nearly the entire political class, including most of his own coalition, and was deeply unpopular. The Liberal Party, for example,
resigned en masse from Lugo’s cabinet just before the impeachment began.113 Lugo appealed his removal to the Supreme Court,
but the court summarily dismissed the petition in a brief order,
using reasoning similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court when
confronted with challenges to impeachment procedures. It held
that the process of impeachment was delegated to the legislature
and that the court had no basis to intervene.114
In effect, then, the Paraguayan impeachment process operated as a (supermajoritarian) vote of no confidence in the president.
There are similar regime dynamics in the South Korean and (especially) Brazilian contexts as well, where the criminal allegations sometimes seem to be used as cover to remove unpopular
presidents who had lost an enormous amount of congressional
support. The Paraguayan impeachment is the clearest case of removal operating to address political deadlock rather than particular individualistic flaws.
D. South Africa: The Ouster of Zuma
We now turn to a case in which a president was in effect removed, albeit in the end through a resignation rather than the
culmination of a formal process of removal: the ejection of Jacob
Zuma from office in the middle of his term as South Africa’s president in early 2018. Although South Africa has a president with
a substantive rather than a ceremonial role, the 1996 South Africa Constitution is more akin to a parliamentary rather than
presidential system. The president is not directly elected by the
public, but chosen by the Parliament. Moreover, as with prime
ministers in parliamentary systems, the Parliament has the ability to force the resignation of the president by voting no confidence in him or her at any time.115 Since 1996, the position has
113 See Daniela Desantis & Didier Cristaldo, Paraguay’s President Faces Impeachment over Clashes, REUTERS (June 21, 2012), https://perma.cc/5HVM-RYP3.
114 See Accion de Inconstitucionalidad en el Juicio: “Fernando Armindo Lugo Mendez
c/ Resolución Nro. 878 de Fecha 21 de Junio de 2012 Dictada por la Cámara de Senadores,”
Corte Suprema de Justicia (June 25, 2012), https://perma.cc/5Z4M-3BH3 (holding that
impeachment is an “exclusive competence” of the Congress (our translation)).
115 See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, art. 102.
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always gone to the head of the dominant African National Congress. Under conditions of ANC hegemony, the president will continue in office so long as he or she can maintain the support of
members of the party.
But, under section 89 of the constitution, the president can
also be removed by a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority via
an impeachment-like procedure, in the event of a serious violation
of the constitution or law, serious misconduct, or an inability to
perform the functions of the office, and a figure removed in this
way may not receive any benefits of the office or serve in any public office in the future.116 Even though the position of president in
South Africa is more like that of a prime minister in other systems, we discuss the case briefly here because it highlights some
mechanisms that may facilitate a successful removal process, especially the involvement of other, nonparliamentary institutions.
The Zuma presidency was characterized by an acute crisis of
corruption. During the tenure of his predecessor President Thabo
Mbeki, an “ANC party-state” developed in which party loyalists
were assigned to high posts in public office, parastatals came under party control rather than state control, and ANC elites increasingly dominated the “commanding heights” of the private economy.117 During the Zuma presidency, the state was captured by a
small group of private actors, who steered public contracts to preferred businesses in exchange for kickbacks.118 Ministers who declined to cooperate were quickly relieved of their duties and office.119
As a result of ineffectual or corrupt presidential leadership, a raft
of structural, macroeconomic problems accumulated.120
Zuma did not keep his hands clean. His country residence
“Nkandla homestead” in KwaZulu-Natal became an epicenter of
public controversy as a result of a publicly funded security upgrade
ultimately costing some R246 million.121 At least initially, the
116

See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, art. 89.
Roger Southall, The Coming Crisis of Zuma’s ANC: The Party State Confronts Fiscal Crisis, 43 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 73, 80 (2016).
118 See Sarah Bracking, Corruption & State Capture: What Can Citizens Do?, 147
DAEDALUS 169, 170 (2018).
119 See Michaela Elsbeth Martin & Hussein Solomon, Understanding the Phenomenon
of “State Capture” in South Africa, 5 S. AFR. PEACE AND SEC. STUDS. 21, 25 (2016).
120 On corruption and the state-owned enterprises, see the insightful analysis in
R.W. Johnson, Cyril Ramaphosa’s Poisoned Chalice, STANDPOINT (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://standpointmag.co.uk/dispatches-april-2018-rw-johnson-cyril-ramaphosa-jacob
-zuma-south-africa/.
121 See Sapa, Nkandla: Nxesi Explains Why Security Upgrade Was Essential, MAIL &
GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2013), https://mg.co.za/article/2013-12-19-nxesi-nkandla-security
117

2021]

Constitutional Law of Presidential Impeachment

107

ANC resisted attempts to hold him accountable. Without an internal check from his party, and with that party playing a dominant
role in the country’s politics, there was a real risk of the erosion
of democracy itself. But the prosecuting and investigating institutions of the state were not particularly active in seeking to hold
Zuma accountable. Only the Public Protector, an ombudsman-like
body with relatively weak powers, seemed to be willing to challenge Zuma’s corrupt behavior and the larger problem of state
capture.
In this context, the Constitutional Court intervened several
times to both protect opposition rights within the Parliament, and
also to require Parliament itself to maintain and use mechanisms
for presidential accountability. Hence, the court strongly suggested that votes on no confidence in the president had to be secret.122 It also insisted that minority rights in Parliament not be
squelched.123 It then held that the Speaker of the House could not
simply ignore a motion of no confidence challenging Zuma’s continued tenure.124 Parliament had a duty to hear such motions, the
court instructed.125 In a particularly critical decision, the court
empowered the Public Protector, whose findings were given legal
force.126 The Public Protector had issued a report that followed an
investigation into the use of public funds for the improvement of
the President’s Nklanda residence. The report concluded that
money misspent on portions of the upgrades should be repaid by
Zuma. The President failed to comply with the findings, claiming
that they constituted mere “recommendations.”127 The court,
however, held that such findings were legally binding and that
the President was not entitled to disregard them. It also held that
Parliament had to come up with a mechanism to hold the president
accountable. Importantly, the Public Protector’s report concluded
-upgrade-was-essential; see also Govan Whittles, Zuma Pays Back the Money—but Where
Did He Get the R7.8-million?, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2016), https://mg.co.za/
article/2016-09-12-zuma-pays-back-the-money-but-where-did-he-get-the-r78-million/.
122 See United Democratic Movement v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2017 (5) SA 300
(CC) at para. 90 (S. Afr.).
123 See Oriani-Ambrosini v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2012 (6) SA 588 (CC) at
para. 62 (S. Afr.); Mazibuko v. Sisulu 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC) at para. 45 (S. Afr.); Democratic
All. v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2016 (3) SA 487 (CC) at para. 38 (S. Afr.).
124 See Mazibuko, (6) SA 249 at para. 72.
125 Id.
126 See Econ. Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC)
at para. 71 (S. Afr.).
127 See Aziz Z. Huq, A Tactical Separation of Powers Doctrine, 9 CONST. CT. REV. 19,
34–35 (2019) [hereinafter Huq, Tactical Separation of Powers].

108

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:81

that in receiving undue benefits from the state, the President had
breached “his constitutional obligations.”128 Many regarded this
statement, now imbued with the force of law, as fulfilling the criteria for impeachment set forth in section 89(1) of the constitution.129
Despite this, Zuma subsequently survived a secret ballot of
no confidence in August 2017.130 The narrowness of the vote
margin, though, demonstrated the extent to which Zuma and his
allies had lost support within the parliamentary ANC party. “It
thus anticipated, and rendered more likely, Zuma’s ultimate February 2018 ouster.”131 The ANC effectuating a removal of its own
leader is a remarkable instance of an intraparty check on power.
Such intraparty checks are quite rare in true presidential systems and are likely to reflect the strategic calculation of party
insiders of how to minimize electoral losses due to an unpopular
elected figurehead.
In short, the South African Constitutional Court forced the
political system to act. It did not directly remove the President,
but it ensured that the processes of democratic accountability
could not be ignored. The Public Protector also played the vital
role of documenting “state capture” in a form that Zuma could not
easily ignore. At least formally, the Zuma case is a “near miss”
rather than an impeachment.132 But it illustrates how institutional processes can cause a collapse in public support for a
leader, which can make their continuance in office untenable.
Across all these cases, the formal processes of removal operated
in tandem with, and were entangled in, changing public sentiment with respect to the presence of not just personal malfeasance, but also a systemic crisis of governance. The South African
case thus confirms that presidential removal operates as a way of
expressing concern about systemic crisis, even if the causal relationship of legal censure mechanisms to public disapproval varies
from the earlier cases.

128

Econ. Freedom Fighters, (3) SA 580 at para. 2.
See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, art. 89.
130 See Simon Allison, Jacob Zuma Narrowly Survives No-Confidence Vote in South
African Parliament, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/S7MA-3HS7.
131 Huq, Tactical Separation of Powers, supra note 127, at 38.
132 See Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Huq, Democracy’s Near Misses, 29 J. DEMOCRACY 16, 22
(2018) (quotation marks omitted).
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E. Impeachment in the United States
With the recent cases of South Korea, Brazil, Paraguay, and
South Africa in hand, it is useful to return to the United States.133
Removing a sitting president in the United States through impeachment has been described as “the most powerful weapon in
the political armoury, short of civil war.”134 Yet this is in some
tension with the thinking at the Philadelphia Convention, where
there is evidence of a rather more capacious concept. The delegates to that Convention borrowed the institution of impeachment from English law, where it had been a device to discipline
and remove the king’s ministers.135 Indeed, over the centuries, it
provided a central power of parliamentary accountability in the
United Kingdom, but was not limited to serious crimes.136 Even
while the debates about the Constitution were ongoing, for example, Edmund Burke was spearheading an effort to impeach Warren
133 The first two articles of the U.S. Constitution establish and describe the impeachment process for the president, vice president, and other civil officers, in the following
terms:

Art. I, § 2, cl. 5:
The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.
Art. I, § 3, cl. 6:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting
for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President
of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person
shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present.
Art. I, § 3, cl. 7:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to Law.
Art. II, § 2, cl. 1:
The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
Art. II, § 4:
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
134 T.F.T. Plucknett, Presidential Address: Impeachment and Attainder, 3
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 145, 145 (1953).
135 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 35; BERGER, supra note 7, at 106–07.
136 See Clayton Roberts, The Law of Impeachment in Stuart England: A Reply to Raoul Berger, 84 YALE L.J. 1419, 1432–34 (1975) (providing evidence for this, and also arguing that parliaments erred about the law).
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Hastings, the first Governor-General of India, for “high crimes and
misdemeanors” in the form of gross maladministration.137
The formation of the constitutional text on impeachment followed from one of those exchanges between two delegates that
admits of speculation, inference, and endless conjecture: one of
the early iterations of the impeachment mechanism considered by
the 1787 Constitutional Convention limited impeachment only to
cases of treason or bribery.138 But George Mason of Virginia worried that those bases would be insufficient to remove a president
who committed no crime but was inclined toward tyranny.139 Mason proposed adding “maladministration” as a basis for impeachment and removal from office, which would have made our system
more like a parliamentary one.140 When James Madison objected
that maladministration was a vague term, Mason then proposed
the usage “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”141 It was that language that was ultimately adopted in the
Constitution.142 The Mason-Madison exchange suggests that a
narrow “bad actor” model fails to exhaust impeachment’s purpose. Yet it also allows different inferences about how far beyond
that model the text ought to extend.
As a congressional report issued during the impeachment of
President Richard Nixon recounts, the phrase “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors” had been first used in 1386 during a procedure to
remove Michael de la Pole, the first Earl of Suffolk.143 The Earl’s
failures included negligence in office and embezzlement. He had
failed to follow parliamentary instructions for improvements to
the king’s estate and had failed to deliver the king’s ransom for
the town of Ghent, letting it fall to the French as a result. For
these failures, Suffolk became the first official in English history

137 See Mithi Mukherjee, Justice, War, and the Imperium: India and Britain in Edmund Burke’s Prosecutorial Speeches in the Impeachment Trial of Warren Hastings, 23
LAW & HIST. REV. 589, 594 (2005).
138 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 51. This original formulation was subject to many
changes. For instance, the Virginia Plan originally envisaged a judicial process for impeachments. JOHN R. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 2 (1978).
139 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 51–52.
140 See id. at 47–48.
141 See id.
142 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
143 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 5 (Comm. Print 1974).
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to lose his office through impeachment.144 Impeachment was subsequently used episodically throughout English history,145 before
falling into desuetude with the creation of modern parties and the
emergence of the “ministerial responsibility” principle.146 Under
ministerial responsibility, a minister can be removed simply on a
lack of confidence, which makes removal a purely political matter
without need for a legal proceeding. Impeachment was last used
in the United Kingdom in 1806.147 Drawing on this history, the
Nixon-era congressional report concludes that “the scope of impeachment was not viewed narrowly.”148
The ratification debates contain further evidence of this “political” understanding. Hence, Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 65 that impeachment would be addressed at “those offences
which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other
words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are
of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to
the society itself.”149 Subsequently, Madison, speaking at the Virginia ratification convention for the Constitution, intimated a
fundamentally political purpose to impeachment. When Mason
raised concerns about the breadth of the pardon power and the
possibility that a president would use it to establish tyranny,
noting that a president could use it to pardon crimes that “were
advised by himself,” Madison responded that impeachment would
be the appropriate remedy in such a case:
There is one security in this case to which gentlemen may not
have adverted: If the President be connected in any suspicious manner with any persons, and there be grounds to believe

144 See generally J.S. ROSKELL, THE IMPEACHMENT OF MICHAEL DE LA POLE, EARL OF
SUFFOLK IN 1386 IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REIGN OF RICHARD II (1984).
145 See JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
158–60 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1883) (stating that “with insignificant exceptions, the
present law and practice as to parliamentary impeachments was established . . . in the
latter part of the reign of Edward III[ ] and the reign of Richard II”).
146 See S.L. Sutherland, Responsible Government and Ministerial Responsibility:
Every Reform Is Its Own Problem, 24 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 91, 94 (1991).
147 See Jack Simson Caird, Impeachment, UK PARLIAMENT (June 6, 2016),
https://perma.cc/P6SF-X5HV.
148 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., supra note 143, at 16; see also
Jack N. Rakove, Statement on the Background and History of Impeachment, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 682, 685 (1998).
149 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 338 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
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he will shelter himself; the house of representatives can impeach him: They can remove him if found guilty: They can
suspend him when suspected, and the power will devolve on
the vice-president.150
Consistent with this evidence, most impeachment scholars in
the United States have argued that the substantive standard
reaches beyond crimes, although there are debates over exactly
how broad the standard is.151 Scholars tend to conclude, consistent
with that sense of the original understanding, that impeachable
offenses must be “abuses against the state” that are analogous, in
injury and intention, to those that concerned the Founders.152
But in the practice of impeachment, original understanding
has not been destiny. Professor Griffin’s examination of the historical record of presidential impeachments shows that “the historical
reality of the Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton impeachments is quite
different.”153 Rather than hewing to the broader “Hamiltonian”
reading of impeachment, as Griffin calls it, presidents and their
supporters have since the early nineteenth century articulated an
unsurprisingly narrower alternative—and have largely prevailed. On this more constrained view, presidents could be impeached “only for committing indictable crimes, or at least significant violations of law.”154 As noted in the Introduction, debates
during the Trump impeachment reflected and deepened this conflation between serious crime and impeachment.
During the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, for
example, “Congress wanted to impeach Johnson for abusing his
constitutional powers to obstruct the enforcement of federal

150 DEBATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA 353–54 (David Robertson ed., 2d ed. 1805). During proceedings regarding the potential impeachment
of Richard Nixon, the House Judiciary Committee also stated that a finding of criminality
was “neither necessary nor sufficient” to constitute an impeachable offense. See STAFF OF
H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., supra note 143, at 24–25.
151 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 105 (3d ed. 2019) (“The major disagreement
is not over whether impeachable offenses should be strictly limited to indictable crimes,
but rather over the range of nonindictable offenses on which an impeachment may be
based.”).
152 Id. at 108; see also TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 7, at 42 (requiring “corruption, betrayal,
or an abuse of power that subverts core tenets of the US governmental system”); SUNSTEIN,
supra note 7, at 56 (“distinctly political offenses” that are “abuses or violations of what the
public is entitled to expect”).
153 Griffin, supra note 32, at 419.
154 Id.
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laws.”155 But the actual process centered mostly around Johnson’s
supposed violation of the Tenure in Office Act by dismissing Edward Stanton from his post as Secretary of War.156 Since this was
not really a crime in any conventional sense, but rather something
more akin to an abuse of power, the tension between different models of impeachment was apparent. In contrast, during the impeachment of President Bill Clinton, the House of Representatives seemed to proceed under a more legalistic conception of the
impeachment power. Three of the charges formulated by the
House spoke directly to alleged crimes committed by Clinton: two
counts of perjury and obstruction of justice. Two of these three
counts passed the House and formed the basis on which Clinton
was impeached; the third narrowly failed. In contrast, a single
count of abuse of power failed overwhelmingly in a 148–285
vote.157 Similarly, during the weeks leading up the impeachment
vote of Donald Trump, many possible charges were put forward,
but the final charges were two: abuse of power and obstruction of
Congress. The abuse of power count was criticized by Trump’s
team as legally deficient on the grounds that it did not allege the
violation of clearly established law, and particularly of a crime.158
Another reason for the dominance of a narrow, criminally focused understanding of impeachment (one not stressed by Griffin)
may be the manner in which the text is formulated. The Constitution is normally read to create a unified impeachment standard
that includes judges, high political officials, and chief executives.159 Removing only bad actors, essentially convicted criminals, makes good sense in the removal of judges as a way to protect judicial independence. Yet the same standard applied to chief
executives may inhibit impeachment from facilitating exit during
political crises, or at least may force actors to make disingenuous
statements during impeachment processes. If so, this would be an
example of drafting choices having unanticipated, even pernicious, effects on major elements of constitutional operation—a
point to which we return in Part III.

155

Id. at 427.
See id.
157 See Richard A. Serrano & Marc Lacey, Clinton Impeached: Split House Votes to Send
Case Against President to Senate for Trial; Livingston to Leave Congress, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20,
1998), https://perma.cc/4YPP-3EVR.
158 See Trial Memorandum of President Donald J. Trump, supra note 33, at 1–2.
159 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
156
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Apart from the question of impeachment’s substantive
threshold, the law and the historical record are sparse. Since the
Founding, there have been many resolutions of impeachment
brought against federal officials. Twenty were formally impeached in the House of Representatives.160 Of these, fifteen were
federal judges, one was a senator, one a cabinet member, and
three—Andrew Johnson in 1868, Bill Clinton in 1999, and Donald
Trump in 2019—were sitting presidents.161 Of these, eight were
convicted after a trial in the Senate, and removed from office. No
chief executive has ever been removed from power following a
Senate trial. The Clinton impeachment failed to achieve the requisite two-thirds vote by a significant margin; the Johnson removal failed by a single vote, 35–19; and Trump was acquitted by
a vote of 48 in favor of conviction and 52 against on the closest
charge, abuse of power.162
The difficulty, and resulting infrequency, of impeachment
generates a perhaps troubling dynamic: it elicits a surfeit of impeachment talk, and arguably improper invocations of the procedure. Because impeachment attempts require a supermajority of
two-third of senators for removal, there is a moral hazard dynamic inducing individual members in the House to introduce
resolutions of impeachment. Members can claim credit without
having to take responsibility for the subsequent costs of an impeachment that will almost certainly not proceed. As a result,
almost every president has faced an effort by members of Congress to use impeachment as a way to paint them as a bad actor.
In particular, in an increasingly polarized era, motions of impeachment have become somewhat routine, even if the process
has rarely advanced beyond the stage of introduction. (In the
post-Watergate era, President Jimmy Carter is the only president
not to have had such a motion introduced.) The Clinton impeachment, in fact, was marred by such problems. Republicans wielded
the report of special counsel Kenneth Starr as a way to paint Clinton as a bad actor. The crux of the debate focused on whether the
acts that Clinton was accused of (essentially, lying under oath as
part of a civil case about his sexual conduct) were sufficient to
warrant impeachment. What got lost in this focus on the conduct
160

See JARED P. COLE & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44260, IMPEACHMENT
1 (2015).
161 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Presidential Impeachment: A Contemporary Analysis,
44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 529, 536, 543 (2019).
162 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 103–06.
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of one man were broader issues of political context: Republicans
controlled the House and thus were able to push through articles
of impeachment, but they had nowhere close to the two-thirds majority in the Senate needed to remove Clinton from office without
substantial Democratic party votes. The prospect of Democrats
turning on Clinton was remote, given that his popularity remained high throughout the impeachment process.
Beyond this, one of the most striking regularities of historical
practice in the United States is the absence—especially notable
in comparison to the South Korean, Brazilian, and South African
examples—of any real role for the courts.163 The Supreme Court
has identified impeachment as the quintessential political question that precludes virtually all judicial review.164 The Court has
found issues related to impeachment nonjusticiable, mostly because the text of the Constitution committed them “sole[ly]” to the
two houses of Congress.165 Since no constitutional text clearly prohibits the Court from supervising legislative action in this area,
this decision is perhaps better explained by pragmatic factors,
such as the chaos that could ensue if there was a constitutional
challenge to the removal of the president, and by the difficulty of
crafting standards to figure out what terms like “try” mean in the
context of an impeachment. One implication of this relatively
light judicial touch is that there has been no “overlegalization” of
impeachment procedure. This at least leaves open the possibility
of impeachment being deployed as a way of removing a deeply
unpopular leader.
In summary, impeachment in the U.S. context is marked by
the gap between original expectations and incentive-compatible
practice. Instead of a serious tool of accountability to remove a
president in moments of systemic risk, impeachment talk has
become an instrument of political harassment. On one view,

163 At the same time, the constitutional text states that the chief justice must preside
over the impeachment trial of the president of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3,
cl. 6. The presence of the chief justice at the most important impeachments (those of the
president) suggests perhaps some judicial role, but there is great uncertainty as to what
the role entails. For a useful discussion of the ambiguous circumstances in which the chief
justice’s role was created at the Philadelphia Convention (by the Committee of the Eleven)
and the absence of floor debate, see Michael F. Williams, Rehnquist’s Renunciation? The
Chief Justice’s Constitutional Duty to “Preside” over Impeachment Trials, 104 W. VA. L.
REV. 457, 468 (2002).
164 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993).
165 See id. at 230–31.
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therefore, it is possible to characterize the U.S. system of impeachment as marked by the worst of both worlds—an ineffective
tool that nonetheless has become highly politicized.
F.

Conclusion

Except for the United States—where the impeachment of
chief executives has largely fallen into desuetude beyond the context of partisan cheap talk—there is a tight connection between
removal mechanisms for chief executives and the presence of a
crisis of popularity. Where both political elites and the public perceive a regime as unable to operate effectively (for whatever reason), they are inclined to support removal. Removal in the global
context is not a matter of individual malfeasance. Rather, these
case studies suggest, impeachment can additionally work as a
systemic means of political reset triggered in moments of deep
confidence crises among the public. Whether this conclusion can
be sustained by a broader consideration of large-N comparative
evidence is the question to which we turn next.
II. THE DYNAMICS OF IMPEACHMENT IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
The case studies presented in Part I suggest that the term
“impeachment” is in practice a catchall for a range of different
practices. In this Part, we ask how frequently one observes different substantive and procedural versions of impeachment
across different jurisdictions in different periods. As noted in the
Introduction, we focus on the removal of fixed-term presidents.
The most important examples of these are in presidential systems
like the United States, where a chief executive who selects the
government and has at least some constitutional lawmaking authority is selected by direct elections and survives for a fixed term
of years,166 or in semi-presidential systems like France, where a
fixed-term president coexists with a prime minister and both figures may have substantial power.167 But some parliamentary systems (such as Austria) also have fixed-term presidents who serve
as heads of state with no real governmental power; we include
impeachment of these figures as well in our dataset, though the

166 See MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES:
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 19–20 (1992).
167 See, e.g., R OBERT E LGIE, S EMI-P RESIDENTIALISM: S UB-T YPES AND D EMOCRATIC
PERFORMANCE 10 (2011) (arguing as well that there are different subtypes of semipresidentialism).
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cases are rare. In appropriate instances, we provide separate statistics for subsets, such as presidential and semi-presidential systems. We draw many of the statistics and analyses that follow
from the Comparative Constitutions Project, a comprehensive
inventory of the provisions of written constitutions for all independent states between 1789 and 2006, with data updated
through 2017.168
A. Impeachment from Text to Practice
It is very common for democratic constitutions to provide for
removal of the head of state under some conditions. As of 2017,
90% of presidential and semi-presidential regimes had constitutional rules that laid out a process for removal, either for incompetence, criminal action or some other basis.169 The procedures
differ widely on such issues as the basis for dismissal, the process
of proposal for dismissal, the process of approval, the period of the
term of office within which the president’s mandate can be revoked, and the various timing of different steps. But they are matters of constitutional text, not of statutory enactment. Yet as the
case of Brazil shows, the fact of constitutional entrenchment does
not necessarily preclude the enactment of statutes with important effects on the process.170 We focus here, however, mainly
on constitutional text. As a result, due caution should be exercised
in drawing inferences about how that text interacts with statutory supplements or institutional cultures. In this Section, we
first provide some basic empirics about the frequency of impeachment, and then lay out some examples of the range of provisions.
The ubiquity of constitutional text on impeachment is
matched by a similar pervasiveness of attempts to remove presidents. Although attempts are not rare, they are rarely successful. One scholar, Professor Young Hun Kim, notes that some 45%
of new presidential democracies faced an impeachment attempt
in the period 1974–2003, and that nearly a quarter of presidents
who served in this period were subjected to an attempt.171 Such

168 See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, https://perma.cc/8QDF-2D6C. For details on the conceptualization and measurement of constitutions and constitutional systems, see Conceptualizing Constitutions, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT,
https://perma.cc/B3C9-ESQQ.
169 Data on file with authors.
170 See supra text accompanying notes 64–65.
171 See Young Hun Kim, Impeachment and Presidential Politics in New Democracies,
21 DEMOCRATIZATION 519, 527 (2014).
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attempts can vary in seriousness, ranging from mere calls by
some set of legislators for impeachment to full formal votes in the
parliament. Defined as a mere proposal in the legislature (that is,
the first two rows of Table 1), attempts are exceedingly common.
Supplementing Kim’s data, we gathered data on all such attempts
between 1990 and 2018, and found at least 210 proposals in 61
countries, against 128 different heads of state. Using Kim’s fourfold framework for level of attempt, we identified the highest level
of seriousness in each attempt, and report these in Table 1. We
add the first two rows to get the total number of proposals, though
acknowledge there is some difficulty distinguishing different
attempts.
TABLE 1: FREQUENCY OF IMPEACHMENT ATTEMPTS 1990–2018
Level
1 = proposal by some deputies to impeach
2 = unsuccessful attempt
to place the question on
the parliamentary agenda
3 = parliament votes on
impeachment but motion
fails
4 = parliament passes an
impeachment vote
Head of state leaves office
before process complete172
Removal through impeachment

1990–
1999
34

2000–
2009
80

2010–
2018
30

Total

22

37

10

69

3

11

6

20

8

8

6

22

3

3

3

9

3

4

3

10

144

These attempts are not uniformly distributed. Impeachment
is quite common in some countries: Ukraine, for example, has featured 25 different proposals in the 28-year period we examine.
Other countries with frequent calls include Nigeria (17), South
172 This row includes some cases in which an impeachment vote was held, but the president was either removed beforehand or resigned, and so does not count as being formally
removed by impeachment. For example, President Viktor Yanukovych was deposed in
Ukraine’s Revolution of 2014, fleeing to Russia. Parliament voted to remove him from office
for being unable to fulfill his duties but did not pass formal articles of impeachment. See
Maria Popova, Was Yanukovych’s Removal Constitutional?, PONARS EURASIA (Mar. 20,
2014), https://perma.cc/SN8N-R2LX.
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Korea (13), Ecuador (10), the Philippines (9), and Brazil (10). Russia had 13 attempts in the tumultuous 1990s, but none since President Vladimir Putin came to power. These are countries, one
might speculate, where ordinary processes of political bargaining
have broken down, leading parties to escalate quickly to the ultimate weapon in the political arsenal. Preliminary evidence also
indicates that such motions become more likely after the first
deployment.
As the last row in Table 1 demonstrates, successful removal
by impeachment is a rarity. We identify a total of 10 cases since
1990, listed in Table 2 below.173 Close inspection of these cases
suggests that successful removal typically involves a situation in
which the opposition has control of the parliament and is also able
to convince some members of the president’s party to defect. Both
attempts and removals are more frequent when the president is
unpopular and does not have a majority of support in the legislature. They often occur in the context of structural shifts in the
larger party system.174
Convincing a president’s copartisans to defect is difficult.
Presidential systems are characterized by single individuals who
enjoy popular appeal but may not necessarily have strong roles
within their own parties.175 Party leaders may have a good deal of
trouble controlling their presidential candidate once in office (and
so the occasionally rocky relations between President Trump and
congressional leaders of the Republican Party are less atypical
than one might expect). While one might assume that this would
lead to parties turning against their presidents on occasion, the
linked electoral fates of parties in the legislative and executive
branches mean that they have relatively weak incentives to do so
(even if they do control the levers of impeachment or removal).176
At the very least, to impeach one’s own party leader implies that
the party was incompetent in choosing the person as a candidate.

173 Writing earlier, Professors David Samuels and Matthew Shugart report that out
of 223 individuals elected in presidential democracies from 1946 to 2007, only 6 were ultimately impeached. See DAVID J. SAMUELS & MATTHEW S. SHUGART, PRESIDENTS, PARTIES
AND PRIME MINISTERS: HOW THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AFFECTS PARTY ORGANIZATION
AND BEHAVIOR 111 (2010).
174 Kim’s analysis also finds that impeachment attempts are more common when the
president is involved in political scandal, and in systems with strong presidential powers.
See Kim, supra note 171, at 521–23.
175 See SAMUELS & SHUGART, supra note 173, at 111.
176 See id. at 108.
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Worse, it might catalyze a fragmentation of the party, as the
spurned leader breaks off with his or her own political coalition.
To illustrate why it is that removing presidents is so hard
even when their party turns against them, consider the attempt
to dismiss President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka. In
1991, a motion to impeach Premadasa was raised in the Parliament, and was supported by some members of his own party.177
Premadasa was able to expel dissident members from the party,
which meant, in accordance with the text of the Sri Lankan Constitution, that they lost their seats in Parliament. Other instances
of failed attempts in presidential systems to use impeachment for
intraparty conflict include the case of South Korea’s Roh Moohyun, as discussed above in Part I.A. Recall that Roh was
impeached after a split in his party, but not removed by the country’s Constitutional Court, as it found that the violations were insufficiently severe to justify a removal from office.178 Again, because Roh maintained public support, and his party was faring
well at the polls, there was a close alignment of interests between
chief executive and party. Under those circumstances, impeachment will rarely occur.
In the context of pure presidential systems, we have been
able to locate one case of a party’s legislative majority voting to
remove its own president. That was President Raúl Cubas Grau
in Paraguay in 1999, who resigned after his impeachment by the
Chamber of Deputies and just before a Senate vote that would
have completed his removal from office.179 Cubas had won the
party’s nomination only because the party leader had been jailed
for a coup attempt. After a political assassination, another faction
in his party attempted to impeach him in favor of its preferred
candidate. This was successful after a period of political turmoil.
Professors David Samuels and Matthew Shugart attribute the
successful removal to a rare instance in which the party in question truly dominates the political scene and all levers of power.180
Intraparty fights thus substitute for the party-against-party competition that typically characterizes general elections.

177

Id. at 112.
See supra text accompanying notes 42–48.
179 See Clifford Krauss, Paraguay Glides from Desperation to Euphoria, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 1, 1999), https://perma.cc/D479-YQV4.
180 See SAMUELS & SHUGART, supra note 173, at 117.
178
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At the same time, it is sometimes the case that a handful of
members of a president’s party will join with others in an impeachment motion or threat. Such was the case when Richard
Nixon resigned under threat of impeachment in 1974. Other examples involving impeachment or related mechanisms include
Ecuador’s President Abdalá Bucaram in 1997 and President
Jamil Mahuad in 2000, Venezuela’s President Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1993, and Guatemala’s President Otto Pérez Molina in
2015.181 In 2005, Ecuador’s Congress deposed President Lucio
Gutiérrez from office for abandoning his duties, though it did not
have to complete the impeachment process because of his resignation.182 In these cases, individual legislators’ interests plainly
diverged from those of the party, perhaps because of differences
in the consistencies represented by different legislators within
the same party, or perhaps because of ideological divisions within
the party.
Table 2 presents all the cases of successful removal of directly
elected presidents through impeachment since 1990. It shows
that the phenomenon is not unknown. But it is also not particularly common. It represents well less than half of 1% of all countryyears in which impeachment might have occurred. The final column of Table 2 also offers a threshold piece of evidence of the impact of impeachment on the political system. It does so by tracking whether the country’s level of democracy improves or declines
as a result of impeachment. To measure democracy, we use the
widely utilized Polity2 index, which rates democratic quality on a
21-point scale ranging from –10 (total autocracy) to +10 (total democracy). By convention, scores of 6 or higher are considered full
democracies. In the column on the far right, we track the change
in the Polity2 rating from two years prior to impeachment to two
years after.

181 In 2015 in Guatemala, the country’s attorney general made a motion for impeachment that was unanimously approved by the Supreme Court. The President was facing
allegations of corruption. After the vote by the Supreme Court, the President submitted a
resignation that was unanimously accepted by Congress. Congress also unanimously
voted to strip him of his immunity from prosecution. This vote by Congress can thus be
seen as akin to impeachment. See Guatemala’s President Otto Perez Molina Resigns, BBC
NEWS (Sept. 3, 2015), https://perma.cc/ZP84-ZFD7.
182 See A Coup by Congress and the Street, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 25, 2005),
https://perma.cc/7N7A-VCXD.
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TABLE 2: SUCCESSFUL PRESIDENTIAL REMOVALS INVOLVING
IMPEACHMENT 1990–2017183

Country

Year

President

Brazil

1992

Venezuela

1993

Madagascar
Peru

1996
2000

Philippines

2001

Indonesia

2001

Lithuania

2004

Paraguay

2012

Brazil

2016

South
Korea

2017

Fernando
Collor
Carlos Andres
Pérez184
Albert Zafy
Alberto
Fujimori185
Joseph
Estrada
Abdurrahman
Wahid
Rolandas
Paksas186
Fernando
Lugo
Dilma
Rouseff
Park
Geun-hye

Polity
Score
Two Years
Before

Polity
Score
Two Years
After

Change in
Polity
Score from
t-2 to t+2

8

8

0

9

8

-1

9
1

7
9

-2
+8

8

8

0

6

6

0

10

10

0

8

9

+1

8

8

0

8

8187

0

183 Archigos dataset supplemented by authors. Note that the result in the final column holds if we extend the period to five years before and after impeachment, but data is
then incomplete for the final two cases. Indonesia, where the impeachment of President
Abdurrahman Wahid occurred just two years after the country became a democracy,
shifted from a score of –7 to 8 by this broader temporal metric.
184 President Carlos Andres Pérez’s removal may have been irregular—Congress declared the post “permanent[ly]” vacant after Pérez fled the country and the Supreme Court
issued a preliminary ruling declaring the complaint to be well-founded, without waiting
for the Court’s impeachment trial to finish. See PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, supra note 95, at 21.
185 President Alberto Fujimori had already fled the country in response to allegations
of corruption and attempted to resign, but Congress insisted on completing the impeachment proceeding. See id. at 184–85.
186 President Rolandas Paksas was impeached for violating the Lithuanian Constitution and his oath of office. His impeachment followed news that he had granted citizenship
to a Russian businessman who was the main contributor to his campaign. After being
found guilty by the Seimas (National Parliament), he was removed from office on the same
day. See Terry D. Clark & Eglė Verseckaitė, PaksasGate: Lithuania Impeaches a President, 52 PROBS. OF POST-COMMUNISM 16, 20–21 (2005).
187 The score for 2018 is used for this Article. No change is anticipated for 2019.
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It is first worth noting that every country that successfully
impeached a president remained a full democracy thereafter, in
most cases without any change in the level of democracy. Even
Madagascar, where President Albert Zafy was impeached in
1996, was still a full democracy a few years later. Peru’s impeachment of President Alberto Fujimori occurred as part of the restoration of democracy after his period of autocratic rule, and hence
we see a significant positive jump in that case.
To this list could be added several instances in which impeachment occurred but the president was not removed, either
because he or she was not convicted or because of extraconstitutional action. Of course, U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and Donald
Trump were examples of the former. Russian President Boris
Yeltsin was impeached in the early 1990s but dissolved Parliament to stay in office.188 Similarly, Alberto Fujimori’s “self-coup”
in 1992 was followed by a vote to remove him, but Fujimori had
already dissolved Congress.189 Only the Russian case, which occurred when Russia could be characterized as a semidemocracy
in the midst of a tenuous (and ultimately failed) transition from
authoritarianism, led to a significant decline in the Polity score.
Finally, we note that the ultimate results of the Brazilian case
are still ambiguous: although Temer’s rocky tenure was followed
by a competitive election, it remains to be seen whether, or to
what extent, Jair Bolsonaro damages Brazil’s democratic structure.190 Early signs suggest that he may be effectively constrained
by the legislature from implementing his most authoritarian
plans, and his coronavirus strategy of denial has generated significant institutional pushback.191
There are also cases in which some kind of removal vote was
held and the president departed, but not through impeachment.192

188 See Edward Morgan-Jones & Petra Schleiter, Governmental Change in a PresidentParliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia 1994–2003, 20 POST-SOVIET AFFS. 123, 156–57
(2004).
189 CATHERINE M. CONAGHAN, FUJIMORI’S PERU: DECEPTION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
31–32 (2006).
190 See, e.g., Robert Muggah, Opinion, Can Brazil’s Democracy be Saved?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/4Y2X-SJT8.
191 Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, The Party Fragmentation Paradox in Brazil: A Shield
Against Authoritarianism?, I-CONNECT (Oct. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/3GL3-QCW4;
Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, The Bound Executive: Emergency Powers During the
Pandemic 29–30 (July 26, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
192 The case of Abdullá Bucaram, discussed below, is one example. See infra text accompanying notes 247–54. Viktor Yanukovych of Ukraine is another. See supra note 172.
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Only two of these led to a country’s level of democracy being
eroded to fall outside the category. These were the 2014 impeachment of President Viktor Yanukovich, which led to him fleeing
to Russia, in which the country dropped from a score of 6 two
years before impeachment to 4 two years after, and the 2005 removal of Ecuador’s Lucio Gutiérrez, in which he fled the country
before the legal proceeding was complete, and led the country to
drop from a score of 6 to 5 in the Polity scale. In addition, there
have been at least twenty formal impeachment attempts that did
not reach the required threshold in the legislature since 1990. Of
the cases, only one, the 2002 attempt against President AngeFélix Patassé in the Central African Republic, led to a significant
decline in the Polity scale, from a score of 5 (just below the conventional cutoff) to –1. In short, impeachment, whether or not it
leads to removal, does not seem to negatively impact the level of
democracy in a country.
How have these instances of removal, as well as the calls for
removal that inevitably precede and surround them, emerged
over time? Has there been a global moment of impeachment? Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the frequency of removal
attempts since 1990, distinguishing calls by a party in parliament
from formal motions of impeachment. The data shows a rather
constant frequency of calls and removals around the world: Intriguingly, there is no uptick in the wake of the 2008–09 financial
crisis, which is generally thought to have triggered a surge of populist discontent and antidemocratic moves.193 Our prior was that
this might have been an inflection point, triggering a wave of calls
to remove elected leaders who had been forced by economic exigency to make unpopular decisions. Contrary to our expectations,
however, there is no concentrated moment of global impeachments. We rather find a constant background drone of calls for
impeachment.

In addition, presidents have sometimes resigned under threat of impeachment, as occurred with Richard Nixon in the United States. For example, Raúl Cubas Grau resigned
in Paraguay in 1999 after impeachment proceedings had been initiated, and during a deep
political crisis. See PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, supra note 95, at 32.
193 See ADAM TOOZE, CRASHED: HOW A DECADE OF FINANCIAL CRISIS CHANGED THE
WORLD 20 (2018). For a more general analysis of the relation of economic crisis and democracy, see Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 71 NEW LEFT REV. 5 (2011).
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FIGURE 1: FREQUENCY OF CALLS AND REMOVALS194
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It is instructive to set this alongside Figure 2, which describes the relative frequency of democracies, autocracies, and hybrid regimes in the same period.

194

Data on file with authors.
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FIGURE 2: THE RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF DEMOCRACIES,
AUTOCRACIES, AND HYBRID REGIMES195

Comparison of these statistics and figures suggests that, in
general and at least in terms of average effects, there is little evidence that either talk of impeachment or impeachment itself is
unhealthy for a democratic political system. While there is one
instance in which a president used the attempt at impeachment
to overthrow the parliament, few would argue that Russia in the
early 1990s was a democracy in any real sense; Yeltsin’s parliamentary opponents, moreover, were largely unreconstructed communists.196 In virtually every other case, impeachment was used
to remove an unpopular leader and to recalibrate the political system. The relative ease of doing so, of course, depends on the substantive basis for removal and procedural aspects. We turn now
to these topics.

195

Adapted from Freedom House data 2016.
Writing in 2001, Lilia Shevtsova noted that the “fundamental problems of democratic development . . . have still not been resolved.” Lilia Shevtsova, Ten Years After the
Soviet Breakup: Russia’s Hybrid Regime, 12 J. DEMOCRACY 65, 65 (2001).
196
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B. The Global Grounds for Removal and Impeachment
This Section presents data on the formal rules invoked in removal. The first necessary step here is to map out the predicate
conditions for removal. Table 3 summarizes the bases for removal
of heads of state as of 2017, as set forth in national constitutional
texts. (Note that many constitutions provide for multiple alternative grounds for removal and so there is no reason we would expect the percentages to sum to one.) We first look at the universe
of the 149 constitutional systems that provide for some such procedure, and then examine a subset of presidential and semipresidential democracies only. The vast majority of serious attempts at impeachment have taken place in such countries.
TABLE 3: BASIS FOR REMOVING HEADS OF STATE AS OF 2017197

Basis
Crimes
Violations
of the
Constitution
Incapacity
Treason
General
Dissatisfaction
Other

Number of All
Constitutions
Providing for
Removal (n = 149)

% of
Constitutions

Presidential &
Semi-presidential
Democracies
Only (n = 68)

% of
Constitutions

88
69

59%
46%

43
19

63%
28%

55
51
20

37%
34%
13%

19
19
7

28%
28%
10%

29

19%

10

15%

As Table 3 illustrates, the most common basis for head of
state removal is criminal misconduct. But apart from the United
States, constitutions generally do not stipulate a requirement
that crimes be “high.” Indeed, the phrase “high crimes” seems to

197 Presidential and semi-presidential democracies are coded by the Democracy and
Dictatorship Dataset, as supplemented by Professors Christian Bjørnskov and Martin
Rode. See José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi & James Raymond Vreeland, Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited, 143 PUB. CHOICE 67, 68 (2010); Christian Bjørnskov &
Martin Rode, Regime Types and Regime Change: A New Dataset 3–4 (Aug. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
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be limited to constitutions directly influenced by the U.S. one,
including those of Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Philippines. Of these, only the Philippines is a true presidential system.198 Its formulation is that the president and other high officials can be removed “on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”199 At
first glance, this seems quite similar to the language of the U.S
Constitution. But the Philippine model of impeachment sweeps
beyond the domain of criminal offenses to cover constitutional
wrongs, as well as “corruption,” which might include but not be
exhausted by formal criminal offenses. In this regard, even the
Philippine model may sweep beyond the focus on individual
criminality.
Beyond criminal offenses, violations of the constitution or the
president’s oath of office are also common predicates for removal.
A violation of the constitution may or may not be a crime in a
particular political system, but it can obviously cut to the core of
the constitutional order. Several countries in Africa stipulate that
the violation must be “wilful.”200 As Professor Griffin has
demonstrated, this possibility has gradually fallen out of constitutional practice in the United States (although the Johnson impeachment contains traces of the idea).201 That said, the “cheap
talk” of impeachment echoing through Capitol Hill, today as before, contains the idea that removal of a president can be grounded
on his or her constitutional infidelity.202
For our purposes, the most interesting category is what we
label “general dissatisfaction” in Table 3, which covers a variety
of situations. In many countries, more general grounds for removal blur the canonical distinction between presidential and
parliamentary systems. For example, the Constitution of Ghana
allows the president to be removed by a two-thirds vote in the
legislative assembly for conducting himself in a manner “i. which

198 The head of state in the Marshall Islands is called a president, but can be removed
on a vote of no confidence. MARSH. IS. CONST. art. V, § 7.
199 PHIL. CONST. 1987,, art. XI, § 2 (emphasis added).
200 See GAM. CONST. 1997, art. 67(1)(a); UGANDA CONST. 1995 art., 107(1)(a); ZIM.
CONST. 2013, art. 97(1)(c); GHANA CONST. 1992, art. 69(1)(a).
201 See Griffin, supra note 32, at 419.
202 See, e.g., Katie Zezima, Obama Action on Immigration Should Spark Impeachment
Talk, GOP Lawmaker Says, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2014), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/08/03/obama-action-on-immigration
-should-spark-impeachment-talk-gop-lawmaker-says/.
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brings or is likely to bring the high office of President into disrepute, ridicule or contempt; or ii. prejudicial or inimical to the
economy or the security of the State,” as well as for reasons of
incapacity or “violation of the oath of allegiance and the presidential oath.”203 This formulation blends two different grounds for removal: policy dissatisfaction and misconduct. Similarly, in Tanzania, the president can be removed if he “has conducted himself
in a manner which lowers the esteem of the office of President of
the United Republic.”204 Uganda’s Constitution allows the president to be removed for conduct that “bring[s] the office of President
into hatred, ridicule, contempt or disrepute.”205 Honduras allows
impeachment to proceed against “actions contrary to the Constitution of the Republic or the national interest and for manifest
negligence, inability, or incompetence in the exercise of office.”206
These standards seem to spill over into the distinctly political bases of removal that characterize the parliamentary system, in
which the head of government is dependent on the parliament for
continued tenure. And like parliamentary systems, in many cases
a legislature in a presidential system can remove the executive
under relatively broad criteria.
In short, the implication of the case studies—that formal impeachment operates in practice as a vessel for the implementation
of broad discontent with a particular regime—thus carries
through in the text of many constitutions.
C. The Procedural Apparatus of Presidential Removal
Processes of removal typically involve multiple phases and
different institutions. They are also characterized by different
voting thresholds (sometimes within the same document) and
time limits. These procedural details also sometimes vary along
with the basis of the removal charge. This means that there is a
good deal of complexity and variation. Table 4 provides the most
common thresholds and actors for all independent countries as of
2017, ranked with the most frequent choice in each category at
the top.

203
204
205
206

GHANA CONST. 1992, art. 69(1).
TANZ. CONST. 1977, art. 46A(2)(c).
UGANDA CONST. 1995, art. 107(1)(b)(i).
HOND. CONST. 1982, art. 234.
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TABLE 4: MOST COMMON REMOVAL PROCEDURES AS OF 2017 FOR
ALL CONSTITUTIONS (n = 194)

Rank
Within
Category

Who Can
Propose? (n)

Legislative
Threshold
to Propose
(n)207

1

Lower house
(100)

2/3 (53)

2

Both houses
required (19)

Majority
(20)

3

Court/
constitutional
council (9)
Upper house
(6)

5
6

4

Who
Approves? (n)

Legislative
Threshold
to Approve
(n)208

Court/
constitutional
council (61)
Lower house
(50)

2/3 (54)

3/4 (7)

Upper house
(17)

Majority (7)

3/5 (3)

Both houses
required (17)

Other (3)

Cabinet (5)

Other (30)

Public through
referendum (12)

-

Prime minister
(4)

-

Cabinet (2)

-

Public through
recall (4)

-

-

-

3/4 (10)

Because of the complexity of the procedures, we organize our
discussion by examining the roles of distinct constitutional actors
in the proposal, approval, and confirmation of decisions to remove
a president.
1. Legislatures.
Impeachment is, as Hamilton noted long ago, a predominantly legislative procedure. This means that it requires the aggregation of votes in one or more houses of a legislative body.
Even if not called impeachment, head of state removal typically
begins with action in the legislature, either in the lower house,
the upper house, or both houses acting jointly. The most common

207 Calculated by summing Comparative Constitutions Project variables HOSPDM1,
HOSPDM2, and HOSPDM3, corresponding to lower, upper, and both houses.
208 Calculated by summing Comparative Constitutions Project variables HOSADM1,
HOSADM2, and HOSADM3, corresponding to lower, upper, and both houses.
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vote threshold is a two-thirds rule. Whether or not the legislature
proposes removal, it often has a role in approving the process.
Again, the modal threshold is a two-thirds vote. There are some
interesting variations. When the legislature is bicameral, for example, it is quite common for an upper house or the two chambers
acting jointly to be the body to approve the motion to remove a
leader. In Ireland, which has a nonexecutive president, two-thirds
of either house can propose an impeachment, in which case the
other house tries the case and can remove with a two-thirds
vote.209 In a small number of cases, however, the legislative role is
nondiscretionary. For example, in Fiji, the prime minister can
propose the removal of the president. Whether removal occurs in
the case of allegations of misbehavior is then determined by a tribunal of three judges.210 Parliament is required to accept the
judgment of the panel.211
Legislative procedures sometimes involve constitutionally
mandated actions by legislative committees or other subparts of
the chamber.212 In Tanzania, a written notice must be signed and
backed by at least 20% of members of Parliament to be submitted
to the speaker of Parliament at least 30 days prior to the sitting
at which the motion of dismissal is to be moved.213 The next stage
entails a Special Committee of Inquiry, whose membership is to
be voted upon by members of Parliament.214 This is formed to
investigate the charges levied against the president. During this
period of inquiry, the office of president is deemed vacant. After
receiving a report from the Special Committee, the National Assembly discusses the report, and can approve the charges by a twothirds supermajority vote of all members of Parliament, in which
case the president is removed.215
2. Courts.
The role of the judiciary in impeachment processes is complex
and varied. At one end of the spectrum is the United States,
where the Constitution gives no role to the courts beyond the chief
209

IR. CONST. 1937, art. 12.
See FIJI CONST. 2013, art. 89.
211 See FIJI CONST. 2013, art. 89 (“In deciding whether to remove the President from
office, Parliament must act in accordance with the advice given by the tribunal . . . .”).
212 See generally Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability upon
Majorities, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 74 (2005) (defining and exploring the use of submajority rules).
213 See TANZ. CONST. 1977, art. 46A(3)(a).
214 See TANZ. CONST. 1977, art. 46A(3)(b), (4).
215 See TANZ. CONST. 1977, art. 46A(5), (9).
210
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justice’s function of presiding at trial of the president, and where
the Supreme Court has signaled that the national judiciary
should play essentially no role in impeachment procedures.216 On
the other end of the scale is Honduras. There, until a 2013 amendment, the only body with the power to remove high officials such
as the president was the country’s Supreme Court.
Most constitutions steer a middle course between these poles.
More in keeping with a quasi-legal conception of impeachment,
courts in many countries have a role in approving the removal of
the president. But the judicial role in impeachment varies quite
widely. In some cases, courts may be limited to ensuring that impeachment procedures are being carried out using the proper procedures by political actors. In others, such as the South Korean
Constitution,217 courts may become involved at the final, trial-like
stage of impeachment, after the legislature has made an initial
decision as to whether impeachment is justified.218 A few constitutions also have multiple tracks for impeachment, some dominated by the courts and some by legislators. For example, the Colombian Constitution provides that if the president is impeached
for “crimes committed in the exercise of his/her functions” or
“unworth[iness] to serve because of a misdemeanor” the House
impeaches and the final trial for removal is before the Senate.219
But where a president is impeached for a common crime, the final
trial instead occurs before the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme
Court.220
The Honduran case, as noted, is especially interesting because removal, before 2013, was concentrated only in judicial
hands. High officials had the right to be criminally tried only by
the Supreme Court; the court had the power to suspend them during the pendency of the trial and could remove them permanently
upon conviction.221 The legislature had no textual removal

216

See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 (1993).
See supra Part I.A.
218 This is also a fairly common design in Latin America, at least for some kinds of
impeachments (such as those involving common crimes). See, e.g., EL SAL. CONST. 1983,
arts. 236–237; VENEZ. CONST. 1999, arts. 265–266.
219 COLOM. CONST. 1991, art. 175.
220 See COLOM. CONST. 1991, art. 175. As noted above, the Brazilian Constitution contains a similar provision, with roughly the same bifurcation of trial procedures between
the Supreme Court and the Senate. See supra text accompanying note 70.
221 HOND. CONST. 1982, art. 313(2); see also generally Norma C. Gutiérrez, Honduras:
Constitutional Law Issues, LAW LIBR. OF CONG. (2009).
217
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power.222 These provisions were important during the constitutional crisis involving President Manuel Zelaya in 2009, which
ended with a military intervention that deposed Zelaya.223 Most
of the Congress and other political officials clashed with Zelaya
over his plans to hold a referendum on a potential Constituent
Assembly to replace the constitution; they alleged that his plans
violated that law and constitution, and that he was disobeying
judicial orders.224 Zelaya initially had a sizable amount of support
from his own Liberal Party (one of the two major parties in the
Congress at the time), but his intraparty support eroded sharply
after his proposal for a constituent assembly and his forging of an
alliance with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.225 However, the
Congress was powerless to remove Zelaya from power directly,
despite his loss of elite support.
Early one morning shortly before Zelaya had planned a “nonbinding” consultation on his constituent assembly proposal, the
heads of the branches of the military arrived at his home and put
him on a plane to Costa Rica.226 They later produced a supposed
charging document and arrest warrant issued by the Supreme
Court for his detention. Critics charged that it may have been
backdated. At any rate it would not explain why Zelaya was put
on a plane to Costa Rica, rather than being brought before the
Supreme Court.227 The Congress met later that same day and declared the presidency to be “vacant”; following the rules in the
constitution, it voted then to ratify the vice president to serve as
president for the rest of Zelaya’s term. Most of the rest of the
world deemed the incident a coup—for example, Honduras was
suspended from the Organization of American States because of
an “unconstitutional interruption” in the democratic order,228 a
222 See Noah Feldman, David Landau, Brian Sheppard & Leonidas Rosa-Suazo, Report to the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation of Honduras: Constitutional Issues
74–75 (Mar. 26, 2011), https://perma.cc/7YBT-B5DH (discussing this unusual feature).
223 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, James Melton & Zachary Elkins, On the Evasion of Executive Term Limits, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1807, 1810 (2011); David E. Landau, Rosalind
Dixon & Yaniv Roznai, From an Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment to an Unconstitutional Constitution? Lessons from Honduras, 8 GLOB. CONST. 40, 50 (2019).
224 See Landau et al., supra note 223, at 50.
225 See J. Mark Ruhl, Trouble in Central America: Honduras Unravels, 21 J.
DEMOCRACY 93, 98–100 (2010) (discussing Zelaya’s relationship with the Liberal Party).
226 See Scott Mainwaring & Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Cross-Currents in Latin America, 26
J. DEMOCRACY 114, 118 (2015).
227 See Feldman et al., supra note 222, at 5–6, 46 (explaining the content of the warrants
and the difficulty with verifying when they were issued).
228 Organization of American States [OAS], CP/Res. 953 (1700/09), Current Situation
in Honduras, ¶ 3 (June 28, 2009).
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suspension that was lifted only after the next set of presidential
elections in 2011.229
The highly legalistic nature of the Honduran impeachment
process likely contributed to the problems experienced during the
removal of Zelaya. First, the process required an indictment and
conviction for an actual crime. It did not hinge, either formally or
de facto, upon a broad and durable loss of support or very poor
political performance on Zelaya’s part. Second, the process was
technically in the hands of a court, rather than the legislature
(although in fact, the final step in the removal was provided by
the military). The country subsequently amended its constitution
to create a legislative impeachment procedure in 2013, after Congress had (illegally) removed several members of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court.230 This suggests that reposing impeachment exclusively in the hands of a judicial body
can present risks of elite capture and can squeeze out considerations of system-wide stability, preventing an exit even in situations where a system desperately needs one.
3. Public involvement.
The public has a role in impeachment in several countries. In
some cases the public can approve the removal of the president
by referendum. For example, in Gambia, the constitution allows
a vote of no confidence by the legislature, proposed by one-third
of members and approved by a two-thirds majority, in which case
a referendum is called for the public to endorse or reject the decision.231 In the Austrian semi-presidential system, the legislature
can call a referendum on the president’s impeachment, requiring
a two-thirds vote of the upper house; if the referendum fails, the
upper house is disbanded.232 In Colombia, members the public
may file complaints against the president or other officials to the
House of Representatives, which must then assess as the basis for
any impeachment resolution before the Senate.233 A two-thirds
vote in the Senate is also required.

229

See Ruhl, supra note 225, at 102.
See Matthew Pomy, Honduran Lawmakers Approve Impeachment Process, JURIST
(Jan. 24, 2013), https://perma.cc/NV2M-9CC7.
231 See GAM. CONST. 1997, art. 63.
232 See AUSTRIA CONST. 1920, art. 60(6).
233 See COLOM. CONST. 1991, art. 178(4).
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In keeping with their populist rhetorical emphasis on the
“people,”234 several of the so-called Bolivarian constitutions of
Latin America also give the public a role in a recall procedure that
shares some features with impeachment. In Bolivia and Ecuador,
the public can initiate the revocation of the mandate of the president with 15% of registered voters proposing it.235 There are temporal restrictions: in Bolivia it can only be invoked after at least
half the term has elapsed, while in Ecuador after the first year
(and in both countries so long as at least one year remains in the
term).236 Similarly, in Venezuela, 20% of registered voters can petition for a referendum to dismiss the president, after at least half
the term has elapsed.237 Only one petition to remove the president
can be filed during his or her term of office.238 The absolute number of voters in favor of dismissal must be equal to or greater than
the number of voters who elected the president, and voters in favor of the dismissal must be equal to or greater than 25% of the
total number of registered voters.239
Interestingly, nineteen U.S. states allow recall of elected governors. The procedure remains rare, having been used only three
times in U.S. history, of which two led to successful removals.240
In 2012, for instance, Governor Scott Walker of Wisconsin was
subjected to a recall election, but he retained office.241
Our case studies indicate another, more informal, mode of
public involvement, namely mass protest. When large numbers of
citizens come out into the streets, as happened in Brazil and
South Korea, it can inform politicians about the depth of opposition to a leader, and in fact can itself be the crisis of governability
to which impeachment responds.
D. Substitutes for Impeachment
We have focused so far on impeachment and cognate removal
devices. But some constitutions contain other provisions that

234 See, e.g., Susan Spronk, Pink Tide? Neoliberalism and Its Alternatives in Latin
America, 33 CAN. J. LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN STUD. 173, 182 (2008).
235 See BOL. CONST. 2009, art. 240; ECUADOR CONST. 2008, art. 105.
236 See BOL. CONST. 2009, art. 240; ECUADOR CONST. 2008, art. 105.
237 See VENEZ. CONST. 1999, art. 72.
238 See VENEZ. CONST. 1999, art. 72.
239 See VENEZ. CONST. 1999, art. 72.
240 Amy Zacks, Recalling Governors: An Overview, RUTGERS CTR. ON THE AM.
GOVERNOR (Apr. 25, 2012), https://perma.cc/D6XL-QGK9.
241 See id.
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might be taken to be a substitute for the impeachment and removal of a president under certain circumstances. A censure procedure is one example (and in fact there have been four resolutions of censure against presidents in U.S. history242). For
removal, the main alternative mechanisms are recall and removal
for incapacity. In the United States, the latter is covered by the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which gives “the Vice President and a
majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments
or of such other body as Congress may by law provide” the ability
to certify to Congress “their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”243
When such a declaration is made, the president is removed; the
vice
president
then
assumes
the
powers
of
the
244
presidency.
The most obvious application of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is in cases where the president is physically incapable of
performing his or her duties because of complete incapacitation,
say following a catastrophic stroke.245 But some recent commentary has suggested applying it on broader grounds like mental
instability or obvious unfitness to hold office, arguing further that
these grounds might apply to Trump.246 This broader application
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment (which remains as of this writing
hypothetical) may render it a partial substitute for impeachment.
Ecuador offers a cautionary example of how a similar substitute for impeachment might be used to remove an incumbent
president from office. The populist Abdalá Bucaram was elected
to the presidency and took office in August 1996. His term would
be a short one. His party was not the largest party in Congress
and in Ecuador’s highly fragmented party system, did not hold
242 JANE A. HUDIBURG & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45087,
RESOLUTIONS TO CENSURE THE PRESIDENT: PROCEDURE AND HISTORY 5–8 (2018) (describing history).
243 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. See generally Joel K. Goldstein, Talking Trump and the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Correcting the Record on Section 4, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 73
(2018) (canvassing debates on the meaning of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment).
244 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
245 See Roy E. Brownell II, What to Do If Simultaneous Presidential and Vice Presidential Inability Struck Today, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2017); SUNSTEIN, supra
note 7, at 148.
246 See, e.g., Richard Cohen, How to Remove Trump from Office, WASH. POST (Jan. 9,
2017), https://perma.cc/MB5T-RZGZ; Lawrence M. Friedman & David M. Siegel, The Most
Important Qualification for a Post in President Trump’s Cabinet, NEW ENG. L. REV. F.
(Feb. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/P6YQ-HGHW (discussing the importance of Cabinet
members to be willing to fulfill responsibilities under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and
the failure of senators to question Cabinet nominees on the subject).
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anywhere near a majority of seats, making it hard for Bucaram
to govern.247 In addition, he took office in the midst of serious economic problems, and shifted from his prior populist stance to propose highly unpopular neoliberal austerity measures to deal with
the crisis.248 Many of his former allies, such as Ecuador’s indigenous parties and movements, abandoned him after he made these
proposals.249
Bucaram nonetheless retained sufficient support to avoid impeachment and removal, which would have needed a two-thirds
supermajority in the Congress. Faced with this problem, opponents of Bucaram turned to another constitutional provision
providing that the president would “cease to perform his/her duties and shall leave office” for “physical or mental disability . . . so
declared by the National Assembly.”250 The key point is that the
“incapacity” clause could be activated by a majority of Congress,
rather than the two-thirds supermajority needed for impeachment.251 By a vote of 44–34, the Congress declared Bucaram
“mentally incapacitated” and removed him from power in February 1997, only about six months after he had taken office. Congress initially ignored the constitutional article governing succession and appointed the president of Congress, Fabián Alarcón,
rather than the vice president, as the new national president,
before technically complying with it and having the vice president
serve as president for two days before resigning to make way for
Alarcón.252
Bucaram was a colorful and unstable figure, who led a populist party with no clear ideology. He even embraced the seemingly
derogatory nickname “the crazy one” (el loco).253 But he was not
mentally incapacitated by any reasonable definition. His dubious
removal deepened the political crisis in Ecuador and ushered in a

247 See Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Impeachment or Backsliding: Threats to Democracy in the
Twenty-First Century, 33 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS 1, 2 (2018) (noting
that Bucaram’s party had only 23% of legislative seats).
248 See SUSAN C. STOKES, MANDATES AND DEMOCRACY: NEOLIBERALISM BY SURPRISE
IN LATIN AMERICA 1–2 (2001).
249 Leon Zamosc, The Indian Movement and Political Democracy in Ecuador, 49 LATIN
AM. POL. & SOC’Y 1, 11–12 (2007).
250 ECUADOR CONST. 2008, art. 145.
251 ECUADOR CONST. 2008, art. 145.
252 See Gabriel Escobar, Ecuadorian Lawmaker Renamed President, WASH. POST
(Feb. 12, 1997), https://perma.cc/CUC7-JSQJ.
253 See CARLOS DE LA TORRE, POPULIST SEDUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA 92 (2d ed. 2010).
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period of extraordinary instability.254 Between 1997 and 2007, the
country had seven distinct presidents, none of whom served a full
constitutional term of four years. The incident may thus suggest
concerns about the use of substitute mechanisms such as incapacity clauses to evade the normal rules and voting thresholds of impeachment. It suggests that those clauses may best be limited to
a narrow set of circumstances in which their criteria are clearly
met. Broader interpretations may destabilize the constitutional
order because of the deep contestability and malleability of the
category of mental incapacity. Furthermore, impeachment itself
may need to be constructed in such a way that it is usable during
a significant crisis, so as to avoid political actors from turning to
either dubious alternatives such as in Ecuador, or clearly illegal
steps such as the military intervention in Honduras.
E. The Consequences of Successful and Failed Removal Efforts
A successful impeachment process will typically lead to the
immediate removal of the chief executive. Sometimes the president is suspended from serving after the initial vote, until the complete resolution of the process. Failed procedures can also have
formal and informal consequences, however. For example, Tanzania also involves a feature of removal procedures that looks parliamentary in character.255 If at the end of the process the vote for
removal fails, no new motion can be brought for twenty months.
This means the president can be somewhat insulated from repeated abuse of the legislative procedures, an institutional design
that resembles parliamentary systems, which typically protect
prime ministers from votes of no confidence for a period after a
failed attempt.
On the other hand, when an impeachment does go through,
ouster may not be its sole effect. In addition to removal from office, constitutional impeachment provisions also envisage lifetime
(or more limited) bans on holding public office, criminal punishment,
and new elections. Consider these in turn.
A first important constitutional choice concerns whether an
impeached executive may run again. Some constitutions ban a

254 See Laurence Whitehead, High Anxiety in the Andes: Bolivia and the Viability of
Democracy, 12 J. DEMOCRACY 6, 7 (2001).
255 See TANZ. CONST. 1977, art. 46A(2)(c) (“[N]o such motion shall be moved within
twenty months from the time when a similar motion was previously moved and rejected
by the National Assembly.”).

2021]

Constitutional Law of Presidential Impeachment

139

convicted president from ever running again for the presidency.256
In 2004, shortly after being impeached, Rolandas Paksas of Lithuania made clear his desire to run again in the next presidential
election. In anticipation, the legislature passed a constitutional
amendment prohibiting an impeached leader from competing
again for office.257 Other constitutions impose shorter prohibitions. In Brazil, for instance, the constitutional text states an
eight-year ban from office upon removal.258 This ban was imposed
after Collor was removed. During the impeachment of Rousseff,
the Congress was allowed to hold two separate votes, and ended
up removing her from office but not imposing a ban on future
runs.259
A second question concerns how impeachment relates to
criminal prosecution and punishment. As in the United States,
the process of prosecution is often separated from that of removal
from office. For example, in Colombia, although the Senate cannot
impose criminal charges, it can refer the matter to a court for
prosecution after removal.260 Indeed, many constitutions allow for
prosecution after leaving office. Collor, for example, was tried for
corruption in Brazil after he was out of office but acquitted in
1994 by the Supreme Court for lack of evidence.261
A third important design decision about removal relates to
whether or not it triggers a new election. In the United States, of
course, removal leads to the vice president assuming the office of
the presidency for the remainder of the term. However, it is worth
noting that this is neither necessary nor particularly common.
For any political system in which the president is indirectly
elected, for example by parliament, the removal of the president

256

See, e.g., ANGL. CONST. 2010, art. 127(2).
The European Court of Human Rights struck down this ban in 2011, holding that
it was disproportionate. See Paksas v. Lithuania, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
258 See BRAZ. CONST. 1988, art. 52, sole paragraph.
259 See supra Part I.B.
260 COLOM. CONST. 1991, art. 175:
257

If the charge refers to crimes committed in the exercise of his/her functions or
that he/she becomes unworthy to serve because of a misdemeanor, the Senate
may only impose the sanction of discharge from office or the temporary or absolute suspension of political rights. But the accused shall be brought to trial before the Supreme Court of Justice if the evidence demonstrates that the individual to be responsible for an infraction deserves other penalties.
261

See Rattinger, supra note 74, at 149.
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will typically trigger a new selection process.262 But remarkably,
it is far more common for presidential and semi-presidential systems to respond to the removal of a president with new elections
rather than to allow a substitute to serve out the remainder of the
term. Our analysis shows that, of presidential or semi-presidential
constitutions which speak to the issue, 74% (51 out of 69) provide
for new elections within a short period, while the remainder provide for a vice president or other official completing the term.263
In other words, the South Korean model described in Part I.A is
more common than the U.S. one described in Part I.E. We consider the normative benefits of this design in the next Part.
F.

Conclusion

Our large-N analysis of constitutional provisions supports
three broad conclusions. First, most constitutions allow impeachment for the commission of crimes, although many sweep beyond
this to allow removal for a range of grounds including violations
of the constitution or poor performance in office. In many systems,
impeachment is not just about removing criminals, but also has
broader purposes such as removing politically weak presidents
who would otherwise be unable to govern effectively. There is also
variation in the process of removal. Legislatures are the modal
vehicle for removing a president, but courts often have a (limited)
additional role, especially in approving findings of other institutions.
Second, there are some empirical regularities in the use of
impeachment: (1) impeachment is exceedingly rare; (2) the risk of
misuse of “maladministration” as a ground of impeachment
seems to be quite small; (3) impeachment is almost always channeled through partisan politics; and (4) impeachment is usually a
response to systemic problems rather than, or in addition to, individual presidential malfeasance. These patterns do not appear to
have changed over time (although the universe of cases is also
small, and hence care must be taken in extrapolating beyond
those cases). They also appear unaffected by exogenous shocks
such as the 2008–09 economic crisis and the austerity regimes
that followed it.

262 For all constitutional systems, we count forty-eight in which another official serves
out the remainder of the term, and eighty-three in which there are new elections, with
seven that we are unable to determine.
263 Data on file with authors.
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Third, the substantive predicates for removal and the choice
between different procedures likely interact. In criminal law, it is
generally recognized that regulators can choose between substantive and procedural law as levers to make convictions either easier or harder.264 A simple index capturing their interaction is presented in Table 5. We separate out two dimensions: the
substantive standard required for removal and procedural difficulty. The substantive standard is coded as high, medium, or low
depending on whether there is no basis for removal other than
illness (high), removal is restricted to serious constitutional violations or crimes (medium), or, alternatively, the constitution allows for more general removal (low). We code silence on the substantive standard as equaling the most difficult level of removal.
To calculate the difficulty of the procedure to remove, we draw on
the idea of institutional “veto players,” or “individual or collective
actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status
quo.”265 We code an impeachment as “easy” if it requires fewer
than the modal number of decision-makers to effectuate (two),
“intermediate” if it has two decision-makers with no higher than
a two-thirds vote threshold in one house, and “difficult” if it involves more than two decision-makers.266 In addition, if two decisionmakers are involved, the process is considered difficult if it involves more than the modal legislative super majority of twothirds, or two-thirds majorities in more than one house of
parliament.
TABLE 5: INDEX OF THE DIFFICULTY OF IMPEACHMENT

Low
Medium
High

Substantive
Standard
35
92
9

Procedural
Difficulty
47
60
29

264 For the canonical formulation of this point, see William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 55–59
(1997). See also Donald A. Dripps, The Substance-Procedure Relationship in Criminal
Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 409, 423–25 (R. A. Duff & Stuart
P. Green eds., 2011).
265 GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK 17 (2002).
266 For our purposes, votes by a joint session of two houses are considered as a single
actor. See, e.g., BURUNDI CONST. 2018, art. 117.
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These two margins of impeachment difficulty are positively
correlated at a level of 0.27. This means that, in general, countries
that have lower thresholds for predicate acts also tend to make
the process of removal easier, although the correlation is not perfect. Figure 3 below presents the range of different countries in
sequence on the horizontal axis in terms of the level of predicate
and procedural difficulty, with the vertical axis measuring difficulty on our index.
FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF INDEX OF IMPEACHMENT DIFFICULTY

As the figure demonstrates, most countries tend to have similar levels for the two variables. Moreover, there is a clumping of
countries in the center of our index. The United States and South
Korea would fall in the center of the figure; Brazil in turn has
relatively lax standards but procedures that are in the middle
category. Overall, this analysis suggests that constitutional design at the global level has converged on a moderate level of difficulty for the removal of chief executives, with a few countries to
be found at each of the extremes.
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III. THEORIZING IMPEACHMENT DESIGN: IMPROVEMENTS AND
PITFALLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND BEYOND
The analysis so far has developed an empirical account of the
design and practice of impeachment in constitutions around the
globe. In this Part, we turn to normative implications of our
analysis. What role should impeachment of a chief executive play
in a presidential system? And given that role, what implications
follow for constitutional design, either in terms of the substantive
standard for removal or in terms of its procedural channels? We
focus here largely on ways in which the design and practice of
impeachment in the United States might be improved in light of
comparative experience. We hence bear in mind normative values
such as democratic governance and the rule of law that should be
widely accepted across the political spectrum. Some of our suggestions (like broadening the substantive standard for impeachment or giving some role to the judiciary) might be carried out
through changes in practice. Others would probably or certainly
require a constitutional amendment. In either case, we aim to use
comparative evidence to contribute to the ongoing conversation
about how presidential impeachment should be operationalized
in the United States, as well as globally.
A caveat: We are mindful of the limited state of knowledge,
the small sample of cases, and the endogeneity of outcomes to the
ex ante choice of legal rules. For instance, we have largely analyzed textual provisions from constitutions in Part II, although
our discussion of Brazil and other cases in Part I revealed that
statutory frameworks can also matter. And, as we noted in the
Introduction, the choice of impeachment-related rules influences
both the rate of removal-worthy actions and events, and also the
tendency of legislatures (and other actors) to engage in impeachment. There is no clean causal arrow running from constitutional
design to impeachments. A focus on formal law also brackets a
host of considerations related to the political environment and
socioeconomic considerations. Indeed, we are skeptical of the idea
of a single ideal or optimal design.267 Given variation in political,
social, and economic conditions, we doubt that there is one “right”
way of doing things when it comes to constitutional design. Institutions must fit their political and social context. At the same
267 See generally Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Knowledge, 2 KNOW 15 (2018); Aziz Z.
Huq, Hippocratic Constitutional Design, in ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 39
(Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z. Huq eds., 2016).
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time, it would be bizarre to suggest that nothing could be learned
from the global history of constitutional design and practice.
Some institutional solutions are likely to incentivize disruptive
behavior. Perhaps the best we can offer is how to avoid bad
choices,268 and to infer likely downstream consequences from what
is known of past practice. At the same time, there is probably a
domain of easy cases where the dominance of impeachment is
clear. In this spirit we proceed to assess the costs and benefits of
the various institutional dimensions we have laid out, beginning
with the overall conceptualization of the purpose of impeachment.
A. Conceptualizing Impeachment: Bad Actor Versus Political
Reset Models
One might usefully distinguish two ideal types of impeachment following the analysis above. The first is what we call the
“bad actor” model. Here impeachment is about removing serious
criminals from office; elections ought to settle everything else.
This is the model, as we have indicated above, that seems to inform most modern U.S. rhetoric on impeachment.269 A second
model one might call a “political reset” model. Here impeachment
is not really about the individual criminality or unfitness of the
chief executive, but instead a response to features of the contemporaneous political context. In this second model, impeachment
can provide an exit from a situation of ungovernability, such as
when a president has lost a massive amount of popularity and no
longer has anything close to a governing coalition in Congress.
The case studies of Part I provide some examples of how this can
occur in the wake of exogenous economic and social shocks.
One of the major lessons of the case studies and empirical
evidence reviewed above is that impeachment is not, or at least
not only, about the bad actor model. Many of the crimes committed
by impeached presidents are rather minor, and we doubt that the
ten presidents removed since 1990 were the only ones engaged in
criminal behavior during this period. Thus, theories of impeachment, such as those common in the United States, that focus exclusively on individual wrongdoing may obfuscate some of the
core functions played by impeachment in constitutional democracies. Impeachment will always be about systemic problems in the

268
269

See Huq, supra note 267, at 41–42.
See supra Part I.E.
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political environment, either in addition to, or instead of, evidence
of serious individual wrongdoing by the chief executive.
Electoral politics typically forms a hard constraint on executive removal. As we have seen in our case studies, even a bad actor will not be removed if he or she has sufficient support among
legislators and the voting public.270 Indeed, without a very high
level of opposition, presidents tend to survive in office regardless
of the individually culpable act they have committed. Typically, a
successful removal involves not just attack by the opposition
party or coalition, but that the president’s former party, coalition,
or allies turn against him or her. Consider the recent case of
Trump as an example—he was virtually uniformly opposed by
Democratic legislators but supported by virtually all Republicans—and his ability to maintain almost monolithic support from
his own party allowed him to easily defeat removal in the Senate.
All of this suggests that a chief executive is most likely to be successfully ousted when he or she is perceived to be linked to a governance situation perceived as fundamentally unacceptable
across the partisan spectrum, rather than as a function of individual foibles. In such cases, the formal basis for impeachment
may appear to be somewhat minor, but the real driving force is
the loss of political support for the leader.
In Part I, we saw a number of different ways in which
“fundamentally unacceptable” can be understood: In South Korea, the president’s reliance on a “shaman” and fortune teller was
perceived to be inconsistent with minimally acceptable forms of
lawful government.271 In Brazil272 and South Africa,273 the central
question was the systemic corruption of the entire ruling class—
and the need for some kind of “fresh start” in which law-abiding
actors would putatively have a chance to mitigate corruption and
graft. No doubt the way in which systemic problems are perceived, described, and evaluated will vary: the important point
here is that absent a sufficiently shared sense of such a crisis,
impeachment is unlikely to occur in practice—even if the formal
terms of constitutional text sound more in the “bad actor” model.
The United States, it should be noted, is no exception to this
trend: efforts to impeach Presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama,
270 See PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, supra note 95, at 36 (noting the importance of a president’s “legislative shield” in determining whether they would survive impeachment proceedings).
271 See supra Part I.A.
272 See supra Part I.B.
273 See supra Part I.D.
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and Donald Trump all failed in part because there was an insufficient consensus on the systemic nature of the problems associated with their presidencies.
In some cases, of course, individual wrongdoing formed a key
predicate for impeachment. But even then, there were also significant problems in the political system that made removal of the
chief executive likely. South Korea offers the best example. Park
Geun-hye was implicated in serious criminal wrongdoing that resulted in a lengthy prison sentence. But impeachment was also
facilitated by a political context in which she had become deeply
unpopular and had lost support from members of her own party.274
South Africa, although again not technically an impeachment, is
another instance where individual wrongdoing by Zuma underpinned a forced resignation that was made possible because of fissures in the ruling ANC over systemic problems of state capture.275 In these cases, the identification of the president as a bad
actor is at the core of an ouster, although a troubled political context must still exist for the removal to occur.
In contrast, in some other cases and constitutional designs,
impeachment does not respond to serious individual failings of
chief executives. It is almost exclusively about the political context. Consider Brazil and Paraguay: In the former, Rousseff was
implicated at most in failing to suppress a corruption scandal engulfing the entire political class, and more directly in budgetary
accounting “tricks” engaged in by administrations before her.276
In the latter, the allegations against Lugo were aimed squarely
at his performance in office, not at individual wrongdoing. Both
constitutions have broad, political standards for impeachment,
and removal occurred because of weaknesses in the chief executives that made it possible.277 In these cases, in other words, individual wrongdoing or the removal of bad actors is at most incidental to a process driven by broader concerns.
Is the broader model of impeachment that we present, focused on systemic rather than individual wrongdoing, a good or a
bad thing from a normative perspective? This is a difficult question to answer. But we are inclined to answer the question, at
least tentatively, in the affirmative.

274
275
276
277

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.D.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.C.
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It is useful to develop the case for a political reset conception
of impeachment by situating that conception within the contrast
between presidential and parliamentary systems of government.278 Recognition of the political reset paradigm, in effect, is a
way of seeing how the two forms of governance can converge toward each other in practice, even as they remain formally distinct. Parliamentarism, according to one fairly representative definition is “a system of government in which the executive is
chosen by, and responsible to, an elective body (the legislature),
thus creating a single locus of sovereignty at the national level.”279
The essence of parliamentarism is a logic of mutual dependence
between the legislative and executive branches: either institution
has the ability to bring down the other.280 The government can
dissolve the legislature. Likewise, a legislature can bring down
the government by voting no confidence in it. In contrast, presidentialism has a logic of mutual independence, where the president and the legislature are separately elected for fixed terms.
Under ordinary conditions neither has the ability to curtail the
term of the other.281
Impeachment is an exception to this rule of independent and
durable electoral mandates. Correlatively, it is conceptualized as
a rare and exceptional measure, one that violates the usual structural independence of the two institutions. The opposite is supposed to be true in a parliamentary system. Indeed, the very fact
that in parliamentary systems the legislature may generally vote
no confidence in the government for any reason at all is indicative
of the very different conception of legislative/executive relations
as mediated through removal protocols. The latter, of course, are
quite distinct from appointment-related arrangements. Arrangements for executive removal are a core element of the distinction
between presidential and parliamentary systems. Interestingly,
although some prior work has explored various ways in which
presidential systems can evolve parliamentary features (and vice
versa), this line of inquiry has not focused on removal of the chief

278 See generally, e.g., SAMUELS & SHUGART, supra note 173; Matthew Soberg Shugart
& Stephan Haggard, Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems, in PRESIDENTS,
PARLIAMENTS, AND POLICY 64 (Stephan Haggard & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2001).
279 John Gerring, Strom C. Thacker & Carola Moreno, Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567, 571 (2005).
280 See Alfred Stepan & Cindy Skach, Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic
Consolidation: Parliamentarianism Versus Presidentialism, 46 WORLD POL. 1, 3 (1993).
281 See id. at 3–4.
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executive, which is seen as a canonical distinction between the
two types.282
The contest between presidentialism and parliamentarism
has spurred an enormous literature with few clear conclusions.
At minimum, the performance of each regime type depends on
many other variables, including the nature of the political party
system in which the regime is embedded.283 That said, one of the
core arguments against presidentialism rests on the personalization and centralization of power in a single individual, the president. Some work has argued that this may pose a heightened risk
of moves toward authoritarianism.284 Others have pointed out
that especially when the president and legislature are dominated
by different parties or movements, presidential systems may calcify into policy gridlock.285 Gridlock may feed perceptions that government is ineffective, or stimulate expansions in executive
power that spark moves toward authoritarianism. A well-known
example is Chile in 1973, where the administration of President
Salvador Allende faced a hostile Congress, navigated around that
Congress through increasingly aggressive decree powers, and
amidst rising tensions was removed in a military coup that led to
a brutal dictatorship.286 In a well-functioning parliamentary system, a government that lacked at least implicit parliamentary
support would likely fall in short order, leading either to a new
government that had such support, or new legislative elections.287
Nevertheless, some of the criticisms of presidential systems
can be blunted by tweaking the design and practice of impeachment to avoid or mitigate the kind of deep crisis to which presidentialism sometimes seems to succumb. The case studies highlighted in Part I suggest that impeachment can play instead the

282

See, generally e.g., Cheibub et al., supra note 26.
For an elegant demonstration of the difficulty of drawing simple comparisons, see
JOSÉ ANTONIO CHEIBUB, PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARISM, AND DEMOCRACY 140
(2007) (suggesting that military legacies, rather than the choice between presidentialism
and parliamentarianism, lead to democratic breakdowns).
284 See, e.g., Linz, supra note 31, at 51–52.
285 See Arturo Valenzuela, Latin America: Presidentialism in Crisis, 4 J. DEMOCRACY
3, 6 (1993). For an insightful challenge to this view, see Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology
of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2073 (2013).
286 See A RTURO V ALENZUELA , T HE B REAKDOWN OF D EMOCRATIC R EGIMES : C HILE
15 (1978).
287 The 2011 Fixed Parliament Act in the United Kingdom may have inadvertently
created friction on this dynamic by making it harder for resets to occur. See Petra Schleiter
& Sukriti Issar, Constitutional Rules and Patterns of Government Termination: The Case
of the UK Fixed-Term Parliaments Act, 51 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 605, 608–09 (2016).
283
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same sort of resetting function that is played by votes of no confidence, or dissolutions, in well-functioning parliamentary systems. It does not follow that impeachment should be easy, or
become routinized. Indeed, we think it is likely to remain an offthe-equilibrium-path outcome in most systems. In comparative
terms, impeachment is a relatively rare, and potentially traumatic, event in essentially all presidential democracies. But so too
are no-confidence motions in parliamentary democracies, as they
tend to be deployed with “great discretion.”288 Rather than thinking of impeachment as distinct and more infrequent than a noconfidence motion, impeachment can be conceptualized as a similar tool for navigating between the rigid and undesirable extremes of a strict rule of fixed-term electoral independence for the
executive and the complete reliance on legislative confidence. At
least in certain kinds of governance crises, permitting the legislature to remove the executive may ameliorate some of the most
problematic features of a presidential system of government. Exactly which such crises should trigger use of impeachment is primarily a question for constitutional designers and practitioners
in individual countries. But the core point here is that the political reset conception of impeachment should be recognized as a
useful adaption that may ameliorate one of the weaknesses of
presidentialism.
Here is an example of how such a political reset might work.
Impeachment may make outsider presidents who are weakly tied
to the existing party system in a country especially vulnerable to
removal. These kinds of figures may be more likely to lose the
support of a coalition in Congress that is sufficient to ward off
impeachment, or to have support erode from within their own
nominal party. Several of the presidents removed under threat of
impeachment or similar mechanisms over the past several decades—Lugo in Paraguay, Gutierrez in Ecuador, Zelaya in Honduras, and Collor in Brazil—constituted such figures. But notice
that these kinds of actors may be especially problematic for the
health of a presidential system. Because of their weak ties to existing parties, they may be less willing and able to get things done
through ordinary political routes and may hence turn to more
problematic paths as alternatives.289 Outsiders may also be more

288

See Huber, supra note 27, at 270.
See Miguel Carreras, Outsiders and Executive-Legislative Conflict in Latin America, 56 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 70, 83–84 (2014) (finding that risks of interbranch conflict
289
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likely to use populist modes of governance that undermine the
democratic order.290 Perhaps then, the greater vulnerability of political outsiders to impeachment is a feature, not a bug, of the
model.
Of course, moving toward a political reset conception of impeachment is not without certain costs. One is that impeachment
may exacerbate rather than defuse political crises. Consider Brazil, where a number of commentators have argued that the removal of Rousseff drew Brazil deeper into a crisis of political distrust and corruption.291 The removal of Rousseff further
destabilized the political system, leaving the country with a weak,
corrupt, and unelected successor, and creating a vacuum in which
the hard-right populism of Jair Bolsonaro could take power in
2019. We recognize the force of this point, although we argue (as
emphasized below) that it can be partially dealt with through
other procedural designs, such as requiring that impeachment
trigger new elections immediately rather than allowing automatic accession by a preset successor like a vice president.
A related problem is that a broader use of impeachment could
increase political polarization, thus begetting cycles of ever morefrequent removals. Some commentators have suggested such a
risk of the “normalization of impeachment” in the United
States.292 But, as shown in Part II, while countries do seem to differ in the frequency with which they resort to impeachment, successful removals are fairly rare everywhere. Even where a more
flexible standard is employed, impeachment has not been successfully used with great frequency. As shown above, impeachment
can be initiated as a purely partisan exercise supported by one
party or movement, but it rarely succeeds unless it has substantial cross-partisan support, often from within the president’s own
party. In contrast, there are countries where irregular removals
and attempted dissolution of Congress increase significantly when the president is an
outsider).
290 See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 13–15 (2018)
(explaining the risks to democracy posed by the “charismatic outsider”); David Landau,
Populist Constitution, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 524–25 (2018).
291 See generally, e.g., Meyer, supra note 86; see also Fabiano Santos & Fernando
Guarnieri, From Protest to Parliamentary Coup: An Overview of Brazil’s Recent History,
25 J. LATIN AM. CULTURAL STUD. 485, 488 (2016).
292 See, e.g., Alayna Treene & Margaret Talev, The Normalization of Impeachment,
AXIOS (Dec. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/JGL3-PHDE (collecting quotes by congressional
leaders); David Marcus, Impeachment Has Become the Dangerous New Normal, THE
FEDERALIST (Jan. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/2XAS-R6A6 (arguing that the U.S. is on a
“wildly dangerous trajectory” because of more frequent use of impeachment).
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of presidents are commonplace and highly destabilizing.293 Encouraging the use of impeachment as a removal tool may in fact
lessen reliance on these alternatives, whether dubious legal substitutes or extralegal maneuvers such as military coups. But
there is no reason to think that successful impeachments beget a
destabilizing dynamic over the long term; at least tentatively, we
think that this also may imply that the current global rate of impeachment is too low.
B. The Substantive Standard for Impeachment
Understanding impeachment as an exit from political crisis
suggests that the standard for impeachment should be framed in
terms that are more political than legal, or at least which leave
room for ambiguity. The danger of conceptualizing impeachment
in purely legal terms, say by tying it to a finding of criminality by
the president, is that this may stop political actors from being able
to impeach in some cases where there is truly a situation of gridlock with an unpopular leader, but legislators struggle to identify
a clear crime committed by a president. If legislators respond by
stretching the meaning of the criminal law, they may undermine
public confidence in the process. If they fail to take action because
of legalistic doubts or because of the threat of judicial intervention, they may prolong the crisis. The Honduran case explored
above perhaps best illustrates the risk.294 Substantively, a president in Honduras could only be removed from power for committing crimes. Procedurally, the legislature played no role in removal, which was delegated entirely to the Supreme Court. The
result was a process that was too rigid to remove an exceptionally
crisis-ridden and ineffective president who had lost the support of
his own party. This in turn led to a military removal. In effect,
the opposition to Zelaya struggled to identify prosecutable crimes
that he had committed, and had to make awkwardly framed arguments to square their purpose with the available legal tools.
The U.S. standard for impeachment, “Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” is notoriously ambiguous,
as we have noted, and debate continues to rage about whether the
term should be limited to certain classes of prosecutable crimes,
293 As an example, consider Ecuador, which had seven presidents between 1997 and
2007, and in which no president completed his or her term in that time period, despite
none of them being removed by impeachment. See PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, supra note 95, at 29 (calling irregular removal in Ecuador “a chronic disease”).
294 See supra text accompanying notes 221–30.
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or should take on a broader meaning.295 As practiced in the modern period, however, it is relatively focused on crimes.296 So read,
the U.S. standard is subject to the same critique as the Honduran
model. As one of us has argued in another context, there is a risk
that the policy disagreements that are endemic to a polity will be
treated as points of legal infidelity. Rather than domesticating
the polity’s endogenous conflict, the law’s decision to treat policy
disagreements as a justification for punishment might escalate
the stakes of political disagreement.297 As the Johnson impeachment and the Clinton impeachment respectively illustrate, it inexorably impels a president’s political opponents to reframe minor legal disagreements as matters of deep infidelity or to
manufacture criminal offenses about the sexual veniality and
vanity of the president. To paraphrase Raymond Carver, politics—and the deep politics of perceived structural crisis—is what
we are really talking about when we talk about impeachment.298
In contrast to the Honduran and U.S. cases, the Brazilian
and Paraguayan Constitutions (as well as many other constitutions around the world) supply the relevant institutional actors
with a broader and more flexible concept of impeachable offenses.
The Paraguayan text, which explicitly envisages impeachment
for “bad performance” in office as well as common or high crimes,
is perhaps the best example.299 The Brazilian formulation, which
differentiates common crimes from vaguer and more highly political acts “against the Federal Constitution,” gets at similar
ideas.300 The advantage of these formulations is that they may
make it easier for impeachment to serve as a reset during a deep
political crisis, even if evidence of individual criminality is scarce.
A relatively broad reading of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” is of course plausible. In fact, it finds substantial support
295 Many U.S. scholars are in fact critical of the modern practice, although they maintain a focus on finding criminal or noncriminal bad acts. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 7,
at 118 (rejecting requirement of common crime but requiring “egregious abuse of official
power”); TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 7, at 45; BLACK, supra note 7, at 38–40 (arguing that
impeachment is not limited to common crimes, but criminality “helps”); GERHARDT, supra
note 17, at 105. Many also emphasize that the standard cannot be so broad as to reach
acts such as “maladministration,” given its explicit rejection at the Convention. See, e.g.,
SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 76; BLACK, supra note 7, at 27.
296 See generally Griffin, supra note 32.
297 See Huq, Legal or Political Checks, supra note 9, at 1522–23.
298 See generally RAYMOND CARVER, What We Talk About When We Talk About Love,
in WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT LOVE 170 (1981).
299 See PARA. CONST. 1992, art. 225.
300 See BRAZ. CONST. 1988, art. 85.
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from both original understanding and scholarship. Such a reading would more easily sweep beyond criminal acts to include presidents who engaged in conduct that created systemic risks.301
Readings of the clause that focus on concepts such as grave
“abuses against the state”302 or the “abuse or violation of some
public trust”303 would do the job tolerably well. Whether a broad
reading would be available given present partisan dynamics,
though, is another question.
A similar analysis illuminates the appropriate voting threshold for impeachment. It is, to be sure, difficult to generalize about
this issue. The consequences of any given voting threshold are
very sensitive to context. But if a key function of impeachment is
to serve as an extreme form of a no-confidence vote in situations
of crisis, then allowing removal by a demanding (but not impossible) supermajority makes sense. In particular, actors probably
should become vulnerable to impeachment when they lose high
levels of support from their own parties and coalitions, something
that comparative experience bears out. Not all presidents who
lose such support are impeached, of course, but that is the kind of
context in which impeachment becomes a realistic option. All this
is to say that we think that most constitutions have answered the
design question properly by using demanding (but not insurmountable) supermajority rules.304
C.

One Standard or Many?

Our argument also has implications for the uniformity of impeachment standards across different types of elected officials.
Consider the U.S. case. As normally glossed,305 the U.S. Constitution establishes the same standard for impeachment for several
different types of actors—the president and vice president, lesser
executive officials like cabinet secretaries, and federal judges.306
Some other constitutions around the world adopt the same uni-

301

See supra Part I.E and note 294.
See Gerhardt, supra note 17, at 108.
303 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 56 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
304 See supra Table 4.
305 We say “normally” because federal judges may benefit from an additional textual
protection: they cannot be fired unless they fail to show “good Behaviour.” U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1, cl. 2.
306 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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form approach. But others, like that of Brazil, adopt different substantive standards (and different procedures or institutions) for
the impeachment of different kinds of actors.307
The differentiated approach adopted by Brazil seems to us
the superior one, and the uniform U.S. approach deeply problematic. A single impeachment standard bundles together several
different types of actors who have different constitutional functions, distinct democratic mandates, are subject to different alternative forms of accountability, and whose removal will precipitate
radically divergent repercussions. The president is the sole head
of a branch of government and generally remains in place at least
until the next fixed election is held. Cabinet secretaries and similar officials often have much more fluidity, since they can often
be removed at will by the president. Judges, of course, also serve
fixed terms (for life in the United States), but generally have no
electoral accountability and serve in positions where political independence is often deemed essential. Lumping all these different
actors together makes little sense. The standard for impeachment
should be tailored to the function played by each actor, and not
automatically set the same for all officials.308
For example, we have argued that removal of presidents will
sometimes be desirable to allow a reset during a deep political
crisis. This suggests a relatively broad, ambiguous standard for
removal of presidents, perhaps incorporating poor performance in
office, abuse of power, or similar notions. In contrast, allowing removal of judges on similarly broad grounds may give the political
branches too much power to retaliate against the judiciary. For
this reason, it may make sense to tether judicial removal to a narrower set of grounds tied to serious criminality. Furthermore, in
the United States, judges are subject to other sanctions for wrongdoing, including judicial discipline and criminal prosecution.
Cabinet officers too can be criminally prosecuted. At least under

307 See BRAZ. CONST. 1988, arts. 51, 52, 85, 86, 93, 96, 102, 105, 107, 108 (setting out
different procedures and standards for different actors, including the president, vice president, cabinet members, and different types of judges).
308 Professor Cass Sunstein argues that although the constitutional standard for impeachment for judges and presidents “is exactly the same,” judicial impeachment should
have a “mildly different and somewhat lower bar” because of pragmatic factors, especially
the “uniquely destabilizing” consequences of presidential removal. See SUNSTEIN, supra
note 7, at 115. This argument may be reconcilable with ours: the predicate grounds of
judicial impeachment should be narrower than presidential impeachment, but deliberations on whether a president eligible for impeachment should be removed ought to take
greater account of pragmatic considerations.
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current understandings put forth by the Office of Legal Counsel,
the president is not subject to criminal prosecution while in office,
which in our view weighs toward a lower threshold for impeachment, as it is the only available mechanism for accountability in
between elections.
D. The Process of Impeachment
It is even harder to generalize about the process of impeachment, for which our case studies and empirical evidence show
great variation. However, one core point that we draw from the
evidence is that process should follow from the purpose of impeachment. The set of considerations that may be dominant
where the core purpose of a removal is cleansing a bad actor may
be different from the core purpose where the impeachment responds to a systemic failure. Relatedly, different institutions may
usefully play different roles during an impeachment.
Contrary to the U.S. process for impeachment, our analysis
in Part II demonstrated that many constitutions involve actors
other than the legislature in presidential removal. Some go so far
as to adopt different kinds of impeachment procedures for different offenses. In some countries, for example, allegations of
criminal wrongdoing involve the courts, while those alleging poor
performance in office or similar political allegations involve only
the legislature.309 This represents a rough sorting of cases in
which the bad actor model is dominant, and those in which the
removal is mainly about political reset.
It seems to us very difficult to take a firm normative position
on this issue of differentiated standards, which may provide some
benefits but also may create new problems, such as determining
how an allegation should be routed between processes. Still, comparative exploration of process helps to show how impeachment
may help to build or undermine the credibility of allegations, and
thus how process and substance interact. The South Korean and
South African removals were greatly aided by the presence of independent institutions that would investigate facts and weigh the
credibility of allegations—the Constitutional Court and Public
Protector, respectively.310 In South Africa, the Constitutional
Court helped to lend additional credibility to the Public Protector
by ruling that its report was legally binding on the political
309
310

See, e.g., BRAZ. CONST. 1988, art. 86; COLOM. CONST. 1991, art. 175.
See supra Parts I.A, I.D.
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branches.311 At any rate, the independence and reputation of both
institutions seemingly helped to enhance the credibility of the
removals.
A comparison to the contemporary U.S. context is instructive.
Here impeachment investigations are often left to Congress itself,
which may undermine confidence in the findings. Two recent impeachment attempts, of course, flowed directly out of independent
investigations, the Starr investigation into Clinton and the
Mueller investigation into Trump. Special counsel Robert Mueller
was not well-insulated from the president, raising concerns about
potential interference or firing, and was not free to make recommendations free of constraining Justice Department legal positions.312 Similar concerns materialized during the investigations
of President Nixon.313 Thus, one problem is that the U.S. constitutional design has a dearth of constitutionally insulated institutions analogous to the Public Protector in South Africa. Of course,
even seemingly independent investigations that have been involved in recent impeachments have not been trusted and instead
have been portrayed as politicized. The Mueller investigation, for
example, has been widely derided by the right (not least by the
President himself) as a partisan “witch hunt.”314 The Starr investigation, which was carried out by a statutorily independent Special Counsel,315 received a similar reception on the left.316
The broad point is that U.S. constitutional design and scholarship could benefit from thinking of the ways in which other institutions might play a useful role in carrying out specialized
functions (such as fact-finding) or in enhancing the credibility of
311

See supra text accompanying notes 126–29.
See, e.g., Matt Ford, Can the Senate Save Robert Mueller?, THE NEW REPUBLIC
(Apr. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/5MCT-MSJ7 (discussing legislative proposals to provide
more protection to Mueller’s office and tenure).
313 See, e.g., Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV.
2187, 2209 (2018) (discussing how the firing of the special prosecutor investigating Nixon,
as well as several attorneys general, sparked normative changes in the executive branch).
314 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Lola Fadulu, Trump Says Mueller Was ‘Horrible’ and
Republicans ‘Had a Good Day’, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/SG9A-248R.
315 The Ethics in Government Act under which Starr was appointed was examined
and upheld in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696–97 (1988). The law provided for an
independent counsel who was appointed, under certain conditions, by a panel of judges,
and who could be removed by the Attorney General only for good cause. See id. at 660–64.
The independent counsel was also required to report to the House of Representatives any
“substantial and credible information . . . that may constitute grounds for impeachment.”
Id. at 664–65. The law was permitted to lapse in 1999, in the wake of the failed Clinton
impeachment.
316 See, e.g., TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 7, at 21; SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 100–01.
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removals, especially in cases where they are tied to the finding of
criminal wrongdoing (or something similar) by a sitting president. Similarly, it may be worth thinking of ways in which institutions might be used to spur the political branches to take their
responsibilities seriously when confronted with the fruits of independent investigations, as the Constitutional Court did in South
Africa.
E. The Role of Courts and Due Process
The role of courts is an especially interesting issue in impeachment processes. As we surveyed above, the U.S. constitutional text is silent on the role of the courts during impeachment,
with the exception of noting that the chief justice presides over
Senate trial of the president of the United States, a role that was
understood by both Chief Justice William Rehnquist during the
impeachment of Clinton and Chief Justice John Roberts during
the impeachment of Trump to be essentially ceremonial.317 U.S.
courts have stayed out of impeachment processes.318 The United
States is not alone in taking such a position; the Paraguayan Supreme Court, for example, took a similar stance after the impeachment of Lugo.319 But the comparative evidence shows that
the posture of no judicial involvement is one end of a broad spectrum. In some cases, such as South Korea, courts play a formal
role in the impeachment process, often as the final step in the
process after an initial political determination has been made.320
In other cases, like Brazil, courts may accept some role of judicial
review, for example to determine whether the procedure for impeachment has been followed or the substantive standard has
been met.321 In the rare extreme, as in Honduras prior to 2013,
courts may be imbued with the sole power of removal.322
The comparative evidence is too thin to establish exactly how
to fix the best point on this spectrum for any given polity. This
likely depends on context. As we have noted, the Honduran solution of placing removal power exclusively in the hands of the
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courts seems deeply problematic, because it ignores the essentially political nature of removal. It required that the president
be charged with a crime before impeachment proceedings could
even begin. It may even have allowed Zelaya to cling to power for
a long time after he had lost the support of virtually the entire
political elite, including his own party. The legislature lacked any
way to initiate removal proceedings against him, even though
they complained repeatedly about his conduct.
Aside from this extreme position, though, a range of forms of
judicial involvement may work at least tolerably well. In the
South Korean case, the role of the Constitutional Court in confirming the removal of the President may have helped to build confidence in the outcome by showing that the removal was not merely
the continuance of ordinary politics by other means. There is an
obvious danger in a court playing this kind of confirmation role:
it may stymie removals that are politically necessary but harder
to justify legally. The countervailing benefit of models like the
South Korean one is that direct judicial involvement of this type
may bolster the credibility of impeachment processes and make it
harder to argue that they are just a politically motivated, “constitutional coup,” as in Brazil and Paraguay.
The Brazilian Supreme Court was heavily criticized for its
various interventions into the Rousseff impeachment.323 But the
Court’s interventions, as well as those of the South African high
court, may still illuminate the ways in which a judiciary could
potentially shape impeachment without outstepping their reach.
The Brazilian Court did not adjudicate any direct attacks on the
impeachment process. Rather, it issued several rulings that
shaped its procedures. The President of the Court as presiding
official of the impeachment trial in the Senate also issued rulings
that shaped the process. More powerfully, the South African Constitutional Court’s interventions had the effect of keeping the
channels of political redress for corruption open, and ensuring
that Zuma could not bury charges against him.324 It provides a
salutary model of a high court effectively and deftly defending
constitutional democracy under the rule of law, even though the
court there made no substantive decisions on the merits of Zuma’s
removal.

323 See, e.g., Aaron Ansell, Impeaching Dilma Rousseff: The Double Life of Corruption
Allegations on Brazil’s Political Right, 59 CULTURE, THEORY & CRITIQUE 312, 318 (2018).
324 See generally Huq, Tactical Separation of Powers, supra note 127.
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In short, there are forms of judicial involvement in impeachment that do not immediately risk the over-legalization trap that
makes impeachment unduly rigid. In this sense, the strict U.S.
position of permitting virtually no impeachment controversy to be
justiciable may be unnecessary, and perhaps even undesirable.
Relatedly, our analysis has implications for due process arguments of the kind made during the removal of Lugo of Paraguay325 or the trial of Trump in the U.S. Senate. From the perspective of the individual official, these seem reasonable claims
because the transparency of a process, and its perceived fairness,
seem potentially important to popular acceptance and legitimacy
of the result. But at the same time, invocations of due process, or
similar concepts, during impeachment procedures should be used
with great care. It is not just, as the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested in Nixon v. United States,326 that an impeachment trial in
the Senate is by necessity quite different from a standard criminal trial. It is also that it may serve a purpose of political reset
that goes well beyond the character of the individual president,
and instead goes more to the political context within which that
president is working. In such structural debates, individual
claims to due process ought to have less weight.
F.

Impeachment and the Hard “Political Reset” of a
Democratic System

In many systems, impeachment works as a hard political reset of the democratic process by triggering new elections upon removal. The South Korean system provides an example: it requires
a new election within sixty days of removal, resetting the schedule of presidencies.327 Indeed, we emphasized above in Part II.E
that in most systems, impeachment triggers a new election. This
design avoids one of the key problems with the U.S., Paraguayan,
and Brazilian systems (among many others): namely that removal of a president means he or she will be replaced by his or
her own vice president, usually of the same party and political
persuasion, who then completes the full term. Restarting with a
new election is closer to the design of a parliamentary system, and
allows the system to avoid gridlock, which as noted above is one

325

See supra text accompanying notes 108–11.
506 U.S. 224 (1993).
327 See S. KOR. CONST. art. 68(2) (requiring a new election within sixty days of a vacancy in the presidency, including those caused by disqualification via judicial decision).
326
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of the risks of a presidential system.328 Allowing the constitutional
order to hit the reset button in this fashion seems to us like a
useful tool.
In contrast, allowing the vice president to ascend to power
once the president is removed, as in the United States, seems a
problematic design. Allowing a preselected official of the same political coalition to ascend to power for the remainder of the ousted
president’s term invites abuse of impeachment by allies of the
presumptive heir to the throne, and it may at any rate prolong
the crisis by preventing a true political reset. The vice presidential succession model raises an obvious possibility of manipulation, where vice presidents or their allies seek to engineer the removal of presidents knowing that they will then ascend to power.
This is not just a theoretical risk, but rather a likely description
of dynamics in Brazil and Paraguay. In both countries, the successors (Michel Temer and Federico Franco) were affiliated with
a different party than the president. In both, there were credible
rumors that the vice presidents were plotting to remove presidents long before the impeachment.329 The description of events
across both countries as a “constitutional coup,” despite the fact
that formal impeachment procedures were followed, depended in
large part on the fact that the movements appear to have been
engineered by supporters of the two vice presidents as a way to
gain political advantage, and as “reactionary movements” by conservative forces against progressive presidents.330
Further, allowing the vice president to ascend to power for
the remainder of an ousted president’s term does not allow for a
political reset. If the vice president is still somewhat close politically to the deposed president, impeachment may do little to resolve the political crisis. Imagine, for example, if Al Gore had succeeded Bill Clinton in 1999, or if Mike Pence had succeeded
Donald Trump. In both cases, the new leaders would likely have
continued many of the same political dynamics as the old. Even
in cases where the vice president is distant from the old president
politically (as in both Paraguay and Brazil), the successor is fairly
likely to be embroiled in similar scandals as the old president.
Temer, for example, was embroiled in a series of corruption
328

See Linz, supra note 31, at 52–53.
See Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff Accuses Deputy of Coup Plot, BBC NEWS (Apr. 13,
2016), https://perma.cc/8TNA-3JZC; Paraguay’s Impeachment: Lugo Out in the Cold, supra note 104.
330 See, e.g., van Dijk, supra note 62, at 203.
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scandals during his two-and-a-half-year interim presidency. Indeed, months following the end of his term in December 2018, he
was arrested for alleged involvement in a corruption enterprise.331
In Paraguay, Franco similarly was embroiled in corruption-related
controversies during and after his roughly one-year term in office.332 Furthermore, neither Temer nor Franco was popular: neither was likely to have won an election.
What should happen instead? We think the case studies of
Part I suggest the superiority of the South Korean design, which
allows impeachment to play a hard-reset function in cases of political crisis. Holding a new election shortly after an impeachment
reduces the possibility of strategic initiation of a removal process.
The relevant players will have more uncertainty about who will
benefit from the impeachment. In particular, supporters of impeachment will need to worry that backers of the deposed president may win the subsequent election, especially if there is a perception that impeachment was undertaken abusively or for a
narrow agenda. A new election is also more likely to create an exit
from a political crisis, since a new president will be able to claim
a renewed popular mandate.333
In this way, impeachment followed by new elections helps to
ease the much-criticized rigidity of presidentialism by giving it a
bit of the flavor of parliamentarism. In parliamentary systems,
governmental crises and drastic losses of governmental support
by the legislature are often, albeit not inevitably, resolved not just
through a change in the executive cabinet, but through new popular elections. Even if new elections do not occur after a change
in government, the new government is reliant on at least implicit
legislative support. In contrast, the fixed electoral calendar of
presidentialism generally prevents the holding of new elections
331 See The Arrest of Michel Temer, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://perma.cc/C4FH-953D.
332 See Attorney-General Opens Investigation into Former President, THE ECONOMIST
INTEL. UNIT (Oct. 26, 2015), https://perma.cc/CBA5-PJVQ.
333 We focus here on impeachment, but the logic of our argument also applies to other
forms of political control of chief executives such as recall. In Venezuela, for example, the
consequence of a successful referendum to recall the president is peculiarly sensitive to
time. A president can only be recalled during the second half of his or her six-year term.
See VENEZ. CONST. 1999, art. 72. However, if recall happens during the last two years of
the term, then the vice president takes over for the remainder of the original term, instead
of a new election being held within thirty days. See VENEZ. CONST. 1999, art. 233. The
combination of these provisions provides only a narrow window of one year (the fourth
year of a presidential term) in which recall can be planned and carried out in a way that
triggers a reset.
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as an escape valve, even during a deep crisis. Indeed, this fixed
calendar is often seen as one of the biggest vulnerabilities of presidentialism, sometimes feeding deadlock and even leading to
breakdown. The removal of a chief executive through an extraordinary process like impeachment seems to us to be a strong candidate for an exception to the general rule of a fixed calendar: it
allows a new election to help provide an exit from a crisis, but at
the same time, impeachment is too rare an event to lead to very
frequent elections that might themselves destabilize the system.
Our argument for a new election rather than vice presidential
succession following a successful impeachment leaves many important questions of constitutional design open. One is who
should serve as interim president for the period of time before the
new election is held. Elevating a relatively weak figure as in
South Korea (or even an outsider such as a judge) may make
sense in such a context; designers may also want to consider
whether this caretaker should be eligible to run in the special
election, particularly given its emphasis on resetting the political
system. Another key question is how quickly a new election
should be held. Again, the Korean solution of sixty days seems
like a fairly reasonable solution. It gives political groups some
time to organize, while ensuring that a reset happens quickly and
limiting time for the new incumbent and his or her allies to consolidate their position.334
A third question, perhaps the most interesting, is whether a
successful impeachment should trigger new elections just for the
president, or for the legislature as well. Having an impeachment
trigger legislative elections in addition to presidential ones may
risk deterring even meritorious impeachments. And perhaps it
seems illogical to “punish” the legislature for removing a corrupt,
criminal, or incompetent chief executive. However, having impeachment trigger mutual dissolution may help to facilitate exit
from a crisis by allowing voters to weigh in on the composition of
both institutions that were involved. There are at least a few examples of presidential constitutions allowing the kind of mutual
dissolution that is usually a hallmark of parliamentarism,335 and

334 A related question is whether there should be a de minimis exception to the rule
requiring new elections in cases where the former presidents had very little time left in
their term. If such an exception exists, we would suggest it should likely be fairly short
(say, no more than six months or a year) in order to allow impeachment to play the reset
function that we lay out here.
335 See, e.g., ECUADOR CONST. 2008, art. 148.
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impeachment may again be a strong case for this kind of design.
Moreover, triggering mutual elections may help to avoid abuse of
impeachment by making legislators think long and hard about
the consequences of presidential removal.336 Finally, it would
avoid unintended consequences in terms of the political rhythm
of the constitutional order, in that it would not lead to asymmetric
terms as between presidencies and legislatures.
CONCLUSION
Based on a broad range of comparative evidence, we have argued that presidential impeachment in practice is about far more
than removing criminals or other bad actors; it often serves as an
exit from the crises that presidential (and semi-presidential) systems of government sometimes undergo when a leader has lost
any semblance of a popular, democratic mandate but still has
time to serve. We have also argued that such a conceptualization
of impeachment is not only descriptively accurate in comparative
terms, but also normatively desirable.
Our analysis has important normative implications for the
debate and design of impeachment in the United States by clarifying the function of impeachment. Some of our findings shed new
light on old problems. For example, we argue for a broader and
more political understanding of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors”
on consequentialist grounds. Others highlight overlooked problems in U.S. impeachment, which could be fixed through reinterpretations or constitutional amendment: that judicial abdication
of any role during impeachment might be neither necessary nor
desirable; that impeachment standards arguably should not be
uniform across types of political actors; and that successful impeachments should trigger new elections, rather than simply allowing the vice president to succeed to the presidency for the remainder of an ousted chief executive’s term.
Following our normative recommendations could make impeachments more frequent, both in the United States and elsewhere around the world. Would this be desirable? As noted above,
Brazil is one of the few countries in the world to have made fairly
frequent use of impeachment in modern times, removing Collor

336 Alternatively, one could include a rule that failed attempts at impeachment mean
that no new motion can be brought for a set period, as described above for Tanzania. See
TANZ. CONST. 1977, art. 46(A)(2)(c).
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through this route in 1992 and then Rousseff in 2016.337 While
there are certainly many problems in modern Brazilian democracy, impeachment as an occasional tool to remove weak and ineffective presidents unable to forge a governing coalition in a fragmented Congress may sometimes ameliorate crisis, rather than
exacerbating it. This would be truer, of course, if the design of the
impeachment mechanism allowed for new elections and thus a
full reset following impeachment, rather than automatic succession of the vice president.
We have also shown that there is no evidence to date that
impeachment or attempted impeachment generates immediate
destabilizing consequences, or is correlated with reductions in
democratic quality. Increasing the availability of impeachments
for systemic problems (although not for bad actors) thus holds the
prospect of mitigating some of the worst aspects of presidential
democracy without generating new costs. It is a constitutional
possibility, in short, that seems well worth exploring.
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